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Using 30 years of data from all for-profit firms incorporated in Belgium, we show that business dynamism and 
entrepreneurship have been declining over recent decades. This decline set in around the year 2000 following a 
decade of declining start-up rates. We also observe a decreasing share of young firms that become high-growth 
firms and more importantly a declining propensity for small (not necessarily young) firms to experience fast 
growth. Interestingly, a similar decline in business dynamism occurred in the U.S., where firms face a far less rigid 
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1. Introduction  
 
 
The process of firm entry, exit, expansion and contraction is generally seen to play a key role for aggregate 
productivity growth. High business dynamism thus implies that resources can easily be reallocated from low 
productivity to high productivity activities in the economy, hence contributing to overall productivity growth.  
While it has been well documented that the level of business dynamism varies across countries,1 usually due to 
different levels of labor and product market regulation, little is known about its evolution over a long period of 
time, stretching various business cycles. Yet, a better understanding of the long run evolution of business 
dynamism seems important to understand the long run evolution of aggregate productivity growth or its stagnation 
in a number of countries in recent years. 
In this paper we fill this gap and study business dynamism stretching a period of 30 years. To this end we use a 
unique dataset from all for-profit firms incorporated in Belgium between 1985 and 2014. We analyze dynamism 
via the evolution of characteristics (dispersion and skewness) of the distribution of firm growth rates and show 
that business dynamism and entrepreneurship have been declining over recent decades. After rising in the pre-
2000 period, the decline clearly sets in around 2000. We initially observe two underlying drivers of this decline: 
start-up rates and high-growth firms. Start-up rates rapidly decline from the nineties leading to a smaller 
employment share at younger, more dynamic firms. This explains about 1/3 of the post-2000 dynamism decline. 
From 2000 we also see a declining propensity for small (not necessarily young) firms to experience high-growth 
episodes. The question remains, however, what caused the decline of start-up and high-growth activity. 
Interestingly, a similar decline in  business dynamism occurred in the U.S. as shown by Decker et al. (2016). This 
is remarkable as firms in the U.S. face a far less rigid institutional environment than in Belgium. The U.S. are 
widely acknowledged as having a flexible, innovative and entrepreneurial economy and are consistently ranked 
amongst the top countries in competitiveness rankings. Business dynamism in the U.S. might be declining, but at 
least starting from a very high level. 
The Belgian economy, on the contrary, is perceived to be significantly less dynamic and entrepreneurial than the 
U.S. Belgium scores mediocre at best at these same competitiveness rankings.2 Furthermore, the OECD puts 
Belgium 3rd for protection of permanent workers against individual and collective dismissals behind Venezuela 
                                                          
1 See for instance Haltiwanger et al. (2014) and Criscuolo et al. (2014). 
2 IMD’s World Competitiveness Ranking (2015, 2016, 2017): U.S. (1st, 3rd, 4th) vs. Belgium (23rd, 22nd, 23rd); WEF’s Global 
Competitiveness Report (2016-2017): U.S. (3rd) vs. Belgium (17th), World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (2017): U.S. (8th) 
vs. Belgium (42nd). 
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and China. The OECD puts the U.S. at place 69 out of 72 countries on this ranking.  Zimmer (2012) shows Belgium 
has the highest mismatch between labor supply and labor demand in the EU-15. Belgium thus clearly has a more 
rigid labor market than the U.S. This hampers reallocation between firms. Belgium can be regarded as less dynamic 
in the business sense and one cannot state business dynamism started from a high level. As we observe the same 
overall pattern in two very different economies, we believe global trends rather than country specific changes are 
at the basis of the decline in dynamism. 
This brings us to additional drivers of the dynamism decline, the ICT revolution and increased globalization of the 
past two decades. We explore the link between ICT intensity of an industry and dynamism and find preliminary 
evidence that the decline is driven by the most ICT intensive industries. We also study the link between dynamism 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the form of the presence of multinational corporations (MNCs). We find, 
however, mixed results. On the one hand, industries with a low MNC presence show the highest dynamism decline. 
On the other hand, we find that especially services sectors with a high presence of MNCs show the largest 
dynamism trend change around 2000. Whether there is any connection between MNC presence and dynamism 
remains, however, unclear and needs further research.     
The underlying drivers we discuss (start-up rates, high-growth firms, ICT intensity, presence of MNCs) can also 
not be seen independently from recent research that points to the rise of market power of the so called “superstar 
firms” where a limited number of firms in an industry become highly successful (Autor et al. 2017). 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main findings for the evolution of the employment weighted firm growth rate distribution. 
We measure dynamism via the difference between the growth rate3 of a firm at the 90th and at the 10th percentile 
(90-10 differential) of the growth rate distribution of Belgian firms. In 1988 a firm at the 90th percentile grew 
about 35% faster than a firm at the 10th percentile. This slightly increased in 2000 to come down to just 29% in 
2014. The difference in growth rates between the 90th and the 50th percentile (90-50 differential) showed a similar 
evolution. This led, together with a small decrease of the 50-10 differential to an overall decline in skewness of 
the distribution.  Skewness is highly influenced by what happens to the fastest growing firms.  
We are to our knowledge the first to study business dynamism based on a multi-decade time series of all for-profit 
enterprises for a European country. It hence allows us to truly disentangle a long-term trend from the impact of 
the business cycle. Our analysis confirms that the decline in business dynamism is a secular trend spanning 
multiple business cycles also in Belgium. In addition, we contribute by linking ICT intensity of an industry with 
dynamism. This has more explanatory value for dynamism than traditional industry classifications based on high-
                                                          
3 Growth rates between periods t and t-1 are measured as the increase in % of the employment at time t over the average 
employment at periods t and t-1. See section 3 for more detail.  
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tech vs. low-tech manufacturing and knowledge intensive vs. less-knowledge intensive services. 
 
 
 Differential 1988 2000 2014 
All firms 
90-10 0.35 0.37 0.29 
90-50 0.19 0.23 0.16 
50-10 0.15 0.14 0.13 
Manufacturing 
firms 
90-10 0.28 0.26 0.19 
90-50 0.12 0.14 0.09 
50-10 0.15 0.12 0.10 
Services firms 
90-10 0.38 0.46 0.32 
90-50 0.25 0.29 0.18 
50-10 0.13 0.16 0.14 
 
Table 1: Summary of Main Differentials of the Employment Weighted Growth Rate Distribution. Dispersion and 
skewness initially go up pre-2000 and come down post-2000 
 
 
This paper continues as follows. The next section 2 reviews the literature on firm and business dynamics. Section 
3 gives the background on the data and defines the main concepts used throughout the paper. Section 4 looks into 
the dispersion and skewness of the firm growth rate distribution and discusses the main empirical findings about 
the decline of dynamism. Section 5 investigates the underlying drivers of the decline: declining start-up rates, 
decrease in high-growth activity, the level of ICT intensity of an industry and the presence of MNCs. Finally, 
section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
The specific literature on firm and business dynamics started in the 1990s where the underlying granularity of 
aggregate net job creation was studied (e.g. Boeri & Cramer 1992, Davis & Haltiwanger 1992,  Konings 1995). 
Although aggregate net job creation might well be modest, one realized there are large underlying flows of gross 
job creation and destruction between existing, newly established and exiting firms.  These underlying dynamics 
are apparent even within narrowly defined segments of the economy. The past decade, taking a microeconomic 
firm level perspective to obtain a better understanding of aggregate movements has received renewed attention.4 
Firm dynamics was also studied again. There now seems to be a consensus that a small number of high-growth 
                                                          
4 The role of firm heterogeneity has been exploited in recent work explaining fluctuations in GDP growth (Davis et  al. 2007;  
Gabaix 2011; Acemoglu et al. 2012), unemployment (Moscarini & Postel-Vinay  2012, trade (Di Giovanni et al.  2014; 
Bernard et al. 2014) and aggregate (export) prices (Amiti et al. 2014). 
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firms contribute disproportionately to aggregate employment growth. Haltiwanger et al. (2016) found high-growth 
firms also make a disproportionate contribution to U.S. productivity growth as resources are rapidly shifted 
towards these successful firms. Andrews et al. (2015) find that some countries are more successful than others at 
channeling scarce resources to productive and innovative firms and show this partly reflects cross-country 
differences in the policy environment. Bravo-Biosca (2016) subsequently links a more dynamic firm growth 
distribution with faster productivity growth and also shows the U.S. performs better than most European countries 
for a wide set of metrics of business dynamism. Criscuolo et al. (2014) show that especially young firms play an 
outsized role in overall job creation in 18 studied OECD countries. Calvino et al. (2015) document cross country 
differences on start-up dynamics and find that most surviving start-ups do not grow. Recently, OECD (2017b) 
released its flagship report on business dynamics and productivity that discusses a wide set of topics based on a 
granular study of underlying business level data.  
Decker et al. (2016) show that business dynamism is declining in the U.S. and the character of that decline changed 
around 2000.  They base their findings on the study of firm growth rate distributions from a large dataset covering 
micro-data of U.S. firms between 1976 – 2011. The literature specifically on firm growth goes back to at least 
Gibrat (1931) who states that firm growth rates are independent of firm size. It has also been shown that the 
distribution of firm growth rates is fat-tailed resembling a tent-shaped Laplace distribution. E.g., Bottazzi & Secchi 
(2006) and more recently Bravo-Biosca (2016) confirm empirically that the distribution has indeed fat tails, but it 
is also roughly symmetric. Both studies, however, are biased towards larger firms as they only include listed 
companies or companies with more than 10 employees. They hence do not capture the fact that the observed 
skewness of the firm growth rate distribution is predominantly driven by small (Capasso et al. 2013) and young 
firms (Decker et al. 2014).  Furthermore, Botazzi et al. (2014) find that financial constraints can magnify the 
negative relationship between growth and size as they not only prevent young, growing firms from exploiting their 
full potential but also weaken the prospects of already slow growing, old firms. Reichstein & Jensen (2005) also 
found clear evidence of skewness in the Danish firm growth distribution, especially for the right tail, containing 
the fastest growing firms. Decker et al. (2016) find substantial, though declining, skewness in the U.S. firm growth 
rate distribution. A fatter right tail, especially in the growth rate distribution of young firms, is consistent with 
theoretical models on firm growth. The up-or-out mechanism described by the passive learning model of Jovanovic 
(1982) implies that young firms either realize they are productive and rapidly expand or realize they are not and 
disappear. Another source of skewness stems from the fact the vast majority of firms is simply static and shows 
near zero growth. Most firms are not willing or not able to achieve growth. Already 2 decades ago, the Global 
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Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)5 made a distinction between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship. Wong 
et al. (2005) base themselves on GEM data and find only a small number of entrepreneurs truly innovate, have 
growth potential and can have a significant impact on economic growth. A small number of fast growing new 
firms, not new firms in general, account for most of the new job creation. Next to modelling an economy consisting 
of 2 types of firms roughly similar to opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs, Acemoglu et al. (2017) find in U.S. 
data that small and young firms are both more R&D intensive and grow more. This is consistent with Hölzl (2009) 
who showed that for countries on the technological frontier (for which Belgium is used as an example) innovation 
becomes increasingly important for small and medium sized firm to grow rapidly. The skewness of the firm growth 
distribution is hence linked with the presence of young and/or innovative, transformational firms. 
The underlying drivers affecting differences in and changes to firm growth distributions are only starting to be 
documented. Decker et al. (2016) link changes of the firm growth distribution to changes in young and high growth 
firm activity. This of course redirects the question to why there are changes in certain types of firm activity. Bravo-
Biosca et al. (2016) look at drivers of the cross-country differences in firm growth dynamics and link them with 
labor market regulation, bankruptcy legislation, financial market development and R&D support policies. 
Goldschlag & Tabarrok (2018) find that rising regulation cannot explain secular trends in U.S. economic 
dynamism. Another recent angle is the increasing presence and dominance of larger firms that leaves less 
opportunities to younger and smaller firms. Andrews et al. (2016) show a growing divergence between firms that 
operate at the frontier and “the rest”. De Loecker & Eeckhout (2017) take a firm level perspective on the evolution 
of U.S. markups from 1950 and find, amongst others, that a decline in job flows is driven by the rise of firm market 
power. Their analysis is limited, however, to publicly listed firms. Decker et al (2018) claim that, for the U.S, the 
changing pattern of reallocation (both economy-wide and within-sector) is not driven by the changing age structure 
of firms. They find a decreased responsiveness of firms to their idiosyncratic productivity shocks which leads to 
reduced pace of reallocation. 
The contribution of this paper is that we now also study long term changes to European business dynamism.  
Contrary to other studies on European data, we cover a 30 year timeframe not only for older and larger firms but 
also for all for profit enterprises. Our analysis confirms that the decline in business dynamism is a secular trend 
spanning multiple business cycles also in Belgium. The decline in business dynamism is hence not limited to 
economies that already were highly dynamic such as the U.S. We also step aside from traditional Eurostat industry 
                                                          
5 See Reynolds et al. (2005) 
 
7 
classifications of high-tech vs. low-tech manufacturing and high knowledge intensive vs. low knowledge intensive 
services and find early evidence that points to the role of the ICT intensity of an industry in explaining the secular 
decline in business dynamism. 
 
3. Data and definitions 
 
 
We have constructed a database from data made available by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). The database 
contains the unconsolidated6 annual accounts of all for-profit enterprises incorporated under Belgian law7 that are 
legally required to file their annual accounts with the NBB.8 These annual accounts typically include the main 
figures of the profit and loss statement, balance sheet as well as figures on the number of employees, sector, 
activity and location. Turnover is only reported for a subset of firms since “small firms”9 report turnover on a 
voluntary basis. The dataset does not include data from self-employed workers that employ other people but do 
not operate via an incorporated legal entity. Data is on legal entity level and does not split figures over multiple 
establishments of the same legal entity. We are therefore not able to make a distinction between organic growth 
and growth from absorbing an acquired legal entity into an existing legal entity.10 We observe these firms during 
the 30-year period 1985-2014. The period 1985-1994 of this database is gathered by Konings & Roothooft (1997) 
and we have extended it with additional data received from the NBB. From 1996 onwards the requirements for 
filing personnel information in Belgium were altered. For the period 1985-1995 we measure employment growth 
based on the reported variable average number of employees during the year, which includes own personnel, self-
employed owners active in the business as well as interim labor. After 1996, this variable is not available anymore. 
For the period 1996-2014, we use the growth in the reported average full time equivalent employees (FTE) instead. 
                                                          
6 Working based on unconsolidated accounts ensures that only Belgian activities and employment are taken into account. It 
does not allow, however, to distinguish between employment focused on the domestic market and employment linked 
with headquarter activity of MNCs or with export. 
7 This includes both locally and foreign owned firms incorporated in Belgium. Belgian annual accounts are not confidential 
and can be consulted at the NBB. Individual annual accounts of the past 10 years can be freely downloaded from the NBB 
website. Older annual accounts can be requested from the NBB at a fee. We have gathered the missing data while one of 
the authors was working as a research fellow at the NBB. 
8 Financial institutions are not included in the dataset as they do not file standard annual accounts. 
9 Small firms are defined as firms that do not exceed more than one of the following thresholds (1985 levels): average 
number of employees 50, turnover BEF 200M (approx. €5M), balance sheet total BEF 100M (approx. €2.5M). Over the years 
the monetary thresholds were gradually increased to €7.3M for turnover and €3.65M for balance sheet total (2014 levels). 
10 This makes the result of our study not fully comparable with studies using establishment level data. The impact is 
expected to be limited. In 2014 9,128 FTE were employed at legal entities that disappeared due to “merger after 
acquisition”, this on a total job destruction rate of 147,450 FTE. In many cases, the acquiring company, in fact, keeps the 
legal entity of the target after changing the ownership. 
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FTE is arguably a better measure for the amount of labor within a firm as part-time work has become increasingly 
popular over the previous 2 decades.11 To map the sector the firm is active in, we use the NACE Rev. 2, 2008 4-
digit classification. We assume the latest available classification for the whole company lifespan. For companies 
not active after 2008 we map the older versions of the classification into the current version. If a 1-on-1 mapping 
is not possible, the biggest companies are mapped via a manual search and the remainder is mapped to the 4-digit 
code via a closest match algorithm. We do not clean the data as we believe what happens in the tails of the firm 
level distribution needs more scrutiny to better understand granular origins of aggregate movements.12 The final 
database used for this study consists of 91,347 firms employing 1,501,988 people in 1985 and 407,374 firms 
employing 1,968,266 FTE in 2014. Detailed descriptive statistics of the data can be found in Appendix A.  
We are the first study that covers almost the full private sector employment for a period of 3 decades for a European 
country. Other studies on European business dynamism are either based on OECD’s DynEmp project or Bureau 
Van Dijk’s Orbis database. Dynemp currently only covers the period 2001-2011 and hence cannot distinguish a 
secular trend from the impact of the business cycle. Orbis offers 10y times series for Belgium and longer time 
series for some other countries, but especially small firms are underrepresented in this database. Since younger 
firms are on average smaller than mature firms, young firms are underrepresented as well. Furthermore, as Orbis 
offers a snapshot of the firm landscape, exiting firms can only be fully traced by combining vintage versions of 
the database which easily leads to underrepresentation of firms that have exited during the studied time period. 
We capture business dynamism by the statistical distribution of firm employment growth rates. The growth rate is 
defined as:   
𝐷𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡 =
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡−1
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡−1
2
 
 
The growth rate 𝐷𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡  for firm i at time t compares the absolute growth between t and t − 1 with the average 
employment of the two periods for firm i. This growth measure follows the definition of Davis, Haltiwanger & 
                                                          
11 To solve the 1996 change in definition, we calculate the 1995-1996 growth by comparing the average number of 
employees (which includes interim labor) in 1995 with the total number of employees at the end of 1996 (a reported 
variable) summed with the amount of interim labor in 1996 (reported separately). We annualize the growth rate as we 
assume this growth is over 1,5 years as it compares an average variable with an end-of-year variable. We come to an 
annualized growth rate of 0,64% for 1995-1996 aggregate employment in our dataset. This compares with a 0,69% growth 
rate for aggregate Belgian employment according to the Eurostat Labor Force Survey. 
12 We do, however, exclude Belgium’s largest employer, the Belgian National Railway Company, from our data as, driven by 
EU regulation, it changes legal entity throughout the period. Since it represents approx. 4% of private sector employment, 
its observed entry and exit has a substantial impact on the employment weighted growth rate distribution. 
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Schuh (1996) and is further referred to as the DHS growth rate.13 It transforms the domain of growth rates from 
[−1, +∞] to the symmetric domain around 0 [−2, +2]. This allows to account for firm entry (+2) and exit (−2). As 
we capture the full firm landscape, we use the employment weighted growth rate distribution. A significant number 
of firms (especially smaller firms) shows no growth at all. As a consequence there is a very large weight on the 
zero value of the unweighted growth rate distribution. An additional characteristic of the Belgian firm landscape 
is that there are many small firms that show very small changes in FTEs.14 This has a limited impact on overall 
reallocation but has the same impact on the unweighted growth rate distribution as a larger firm growing at the 
same rate. Unless otherwise stated, the growth rate distribution refers to the employment weighted distribution of 
firm DHS growth rates.15 
Our analysis is predominantly based on studying percentiles of this growth distribution and the evolution thereof 
over time. We calculate the dispersion of the distribution as the difference in growth rate between the 90th and the 
10th percentile, also referred to as the 90-10 differential. Similarly, the 90-50 differential and 50-10 differential 
refer to the difference in growth rate between the 90th and the 50th percentile and the 50th and the 10th percentile. 
The 90-50 differential and 50-10 differential are utilized to study the skewness of the distribution. The 90th 
percentile is used to study high-growth and referred to as P90. As we focus on the long term trend, the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) trend is included16 as well as the 3-year moving average. We study the growth rate distribution for 
the universe of all firms as well as for relevant subgroups (e.g., young firms, certain sectors, etc.). 
 
4. The Decline in Business Dynamism  
 
We start our analysis with descriptive evidence of the decline in business dynamism. We study the evolution of 
the dispersion (90-10 differential) and the skewness (90-50 differential and 50-10 differential) of the employment 
weighted growth rate distribution. Dispersion is linked with the level of reallocation across firms. Skewness is 
linked with the activity of young, transformational entrepreneurs and creative destruction. 
                                                          
13 The DHS growth rate expresses the percentage growth vs. the average size over the period as opposed to the 
conventional growth rate that expresses the percentage growth vs. the initial size of the period. 
14 E.g., a firm growing from 1 to 1.1 FTE has a DHS growth of 9.5% although only 0.1 FTE is added. 
15 In Appendix B we also study dynamism based on the unweighted growth rate distribution and come to the same 
conclusions, i.e. a secular decline in dynamism. 
16 Given the use of annual data, the Hodrick-Prescott smoothing parameter used is 100. 
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Fig. 1 shows this evolution of dispersion for all firms and continuing firms only.17 The higher the difference, the 
more reallocation of human resources. We initially see an uptake in business dynamism in the eighties. In the early 
eighties Belgium was regarded as one of the worst performing economies in Europe: (very) high government 
deficits, spiraling public debt, high and increasing unemployment and ailing private firms. This led the then 
government to introduce a set of economic recovery policies. Next to a devaluation of the Belgian franc with 8.5% 
1982, the administrative burden to start-up a company was significantly reduced in the period 1985-1987. 
Potentially this led to the steep increase in growth rate dispersion during the 2nd half of the 80s. Depending on 
whether we include entry/exit activity, the decline in dispersion set in early 1990s (all firms, including exit/entry) 
or late 1990s (continuers only) and continues post-2000. We can clearly confirm a continuing decline in growth 
rate dispersion over the past 2 decades. Recessions18 are also marked in Fig. 1. We see little to no correlation 
between a period of recession and a change in business dynamism. This confirms the decline in dynamism is a 
secular trend rather than a phenomenon linked with the business cycle. 
 
Fig. 1 90-10 differentials for all firms and continuing firms only. We 
see a continued decline post-2000. Note: grey shaded areas mark 
recessions, cont. abbreviates continuing firms. Source: authors’ 
analysis based on NBB dataset.19 
Fig. 2 shows the trend in dispersion for different industries. The services industry represents approximately half 
of Belgian employment in the beginning of the period and gradually increases its employment share to 
                                                          
17 The universe of continuing firms excludes entering and exiting firms in a given year. 
18 A recession is defined as 2 subsequent quarters of negative quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth. Real GDP growth figures 
from 1985 onwards taken from the OECD. 
19 Note and source comments are valid for figures throughout the document and not retaken.  
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approximately 2/3 towards the end of period. Services predominantly take share from the manufacturing industry. 
Dispersion in the manufacturing industry gradually decreases. Dispersion in the services industry rises towards 
the end of the 90s, before declining as well. While the Belgian services industry continues to grow in terms of 
value added and employment, Van Beveren & Vanormelingen (2014) find that it actually had a negative within 
firm productivity growth for the period 1998-2009 and that (very modest) productivity gains are purely driven by 
between firm reallocation. The decrease in service industry dynamism must hence be a source of concern.  OECD 
(2017a) consistently urges Belgium to increase competition in the services industry to increase the potential for 
productivity growth. In Belgium, there still is regulation in place protecting existing firms in the retail trade and 
professional services.  
 
Fig. 2 90-10 differentials for the services and 
manufacturing sector. Dispersion in the manufacturing 
sector steadily declines, dispersion in the services sector 
declines since the mid-nineties. 
Fig. 3 shows the dispersion of the growth rate distribution for young firms.20 We also correct young firm activity 
for so called spurious entrants.  A spurious entrant is a newly established legal entity receiving a new business 
number,21 but which is not truly a new firm. A spurious entrant is the result of a relocation of existing production 
factors from an incumbent, either in total or partially, to a new business number. Geurts & Van Biesebroeck (2016) 
find, based on detailed Belgian data of employee movements from the Belgian National Social Security Office 
(NSSO), that more than one third of administrative start-ups with 5 to 9 employees and two thirds with 10 or more 
employees are in fact spurious entrants. True entrants with more than 50 employees are extremely rare. 
                                                          
20 Young firms are defined as max. 5y old. 
21 In Belgium a new business number is only given to a newly incorporated legal entity, with new shareholder capital. A new 
business number is not given when there is a change of shareholder nor location.  
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Unfortunately, detailed employee movements are not available for the long time-period we study. To correct for 
spurious entrants and as a close approximation of the underlying dynamics, we therefore remove all entrants with 
more than 10 employees.22 The dispersion or dynamism at young firms is significantly higher compared to that of 
older firms. A remarkable finding is that dynamism at young firms has actually been rising. The 90-10 differential 
for young firms excluding spurious entrants strongly increases leading to 2000 after which it stabilizes. 
 
Fig. 3 90-10 differentials for old and young firms. The 
differential is significantly higher for young firms and it 
increases until 2000 after which it stabilizes. Dispersion for 
older firms declines post 2000. 
 
We now turn to the skewness of the employment weighted growth rate distribution. Over the years a consensus 
has emerged on cross sectional patterns of firm growth.23 Young firms disproportionately contribute to gross job 
creation and, conditional on survival, show much higher growth rates than older firms. Probability of exiting 
decreases linearly with age and the vast majority of start-ups do not grow at all. The positive job growth 
contribution of young firms is driven by a small number of high-growth firms. These patterns come together in 
the fact that young continuing firms show significantly higher skewness in firm growth rates. The skewness and a 
change in skewness of the overall growth distribution is hence closely linked with the activity of young, 
transformational entrepreneurs and creative destruction. 
Fig. 4 shows 90-50 and 50-10 differentials as well as the difference between the two. We expect the growth rate 
distribution to be skewed to the right-hand side. This implies the 90-50 differential should be bigger than the 50-
                                                          
22 Geurts & Van Biesebroeck (2016) come to their findings based on entrants in the 2004-2012 period and we assume the 
proportion of spurious entrants they find also holds for our time period 1985-2014. 
23 See Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Decker et al. (2016) for the U.S., Criscuolo et al. (2014) and Calvino et al. (2015) for a 
broader set of OECD countries and Geurts & Van Biesebroeck (2016) specifically for Belgium. 
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10 differential and the difference between the two hence positive. Fig. 4a shows these differences for all firms. 
The 90-50 differential is indeed larger than the 50-10 differential though the difference clearly is declining. The 
50-10 differential is, since it is linked with job destruction, counter-cyclical. The 90-50 differential is pro-cyclical 
implying job creation in Belgium is highly linked with the business cycle as well. These 2 findings combined lead 
to the fact that the difference between the differentials is highly pro-cyclical. A striking finding is that the volatility 
of the difference clearly is reducing with each recession, including the great recession. The impact of a recession 
on the shape and skewness of the growth rate distribution declines. Firms seem to adjust their labor force less 
during recessions now compared to several decades ago. 
a All firms b Continuers only 
  
Fig. 4 90-50 and 50-10 differentials and the difference between the two for all firms (a) and continuing firms only (b). For 
all firms, the skewness declines throughout the studied period. For continuers only, the decline sets in around 2000. 
 
Together with a declining dispersion, we can conclude Belgian firms are becoming more homogenous with respect 
to employment growth rates. There is less reallocation and less creative destruction and the impact of a recession 
is softening. Whether or not this phenomenon is linked with the fact that there is a growing diversion between 
“superstar firms” or “frontier firms” and the “rest” as described by Autor et al. (2017) for sales and Andrews et al. 
(2016) for productivity remains to be investigated. 
Fig. 4b  shows the same differentials, but for continuing firms only (i.e. excluding entry and exit). Skewness 
increases initially and declines post-2000. This implies the overall decline in skewness is not purely driven by an 
asymmetrical decline in entry and exit rates. Furthermore, the overall decline in skewness is to a large extend 
driven by the 90-50 differential. As the median firm shows little to no growth, what happens to the 90-50 
differential is closely linked with what happens to the 90th percentile of firm growth rates, i.e. the activity of the 
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fast growing firms which is further explored in section 5. 
 
Fig. 5 Skewness or difference between 90-50 and 50-10 
differentials for the services and manufacturing sectors. We 
The skewness of the services sector significantly decreases. 
For manufacturing it initially increases and comes down 
post-2000.  
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of skewness for the manufacturing and the services sector, both for all firms and 
continuers only. The skewness of the services sector shows a continuous decline. For continuers only in the 
services sector we see a drop in the 80s, a stable skewness during the 90s and a drop again post-2000.  The 
manufacturing sector shows an initial increase but shows a declining skewness post-2000. 
So far, our findings for Belgium are similar to Decker et al.’s (2016) findings for the U.S. A striking difference, 
however, is that skewness for young firms as shown in Fig. 6 does not come down and both the 90-50 and the 50-
10 differentials increase which is in line with the increased dispersion for young firms. Young Belgian firms are 
becoming less homogeneous from a growth point of view. Older firms (figure not shown) show little to no 
skewness. Skewness of mature firms remains fairly constant throughout the studied time period. The 90-50 
differential is significantly lower for older firms than for young firms. A young firm is more likely to experience 
high growth than an older firm. 
In summary, we see an overall declining pattern for dynamism measured via the dispersion and skewness of the 
employment weighted firm growth rate distribution.24 Underlying, we find an increasing pattern for young firms 
and the slightly decreasing pattern for older firms. Furthermore, we see a strong decrease of dispersion (post-
                                                          
24 This finding is robust to using alternative measures of dynamism, including dynamism based on the unweighted 
employment growth rate distribution as well as the (unweighted) turnover growth rate distribution as shown in Appendix B. 
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2000) and skewness in the services industry. Dispersion and skewness is significantly higher for younger firms 
compared to older firms and for the services industry compared to the manufacturing industry. These findings 
indicate that there is potentially a strong role for compositional shifts of the firm landscape as the driver of changes 
in aggregate dynamism. This is further discussed in section 5. 
 
Fig. 6 90-50 and 50-10 differentials and the difference 
between the two for young firms only 
 
5. Underlying drivers of business dynamism  
 
The decline of start-ups and the changing composition of the firm landscape 
 
A decline in start-up and exit rates will ultimately lead to an aging firm landscape where the average firm becomes 
older. The impact of such a change in age composition on the dispersion and skewness of the firm growth 
distribution is well documented. Fizaine (1968) already discovered that age has a negative impact on both the 
growth and the variance of growth rates of French establishments. This has recently been confirmed by Bravo-
Biosca (2016) who estimates that young firms grow about 3.5 times faster than older firms based on data for 
several countries. Earlier, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) came to a similar conclusion for the U.S. Specifically for 
Belgium, Geurts & Van Biesebroeck (2016) find that conditional on size, the growth rate of start-up firms reduces 
with age.  This evidence indeed suggests that a decline in start-up rates and the rise of incumbent, “superstar firms” 
shifts the age distribution towards older firms. This has a negative impact on dispersion and skewness of the 
growth rate distribution. 
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a Relative entry/exit incidence b Relative entry/exit employment  
  
Fig. 7 Relative firm entry and exit rates in # of firms entering/exiting as % of all firms (a) and in employment at firms 
entering/exiting as % of all firms (b). Entry is corrected for spurious entrants. After an initial uptake, there is a strong 
decline in entry. Exit rates experience a gradual decline as well. 
Fig. 7 shows the relative firm entry and exit rate both for the number of firms (Fig. 7a) as well as the relative 
employment25 they represent (Fig. 7b). Table 3 and Table 4 in Appendix A give further detail on relative entry 
and exit rates at NACE 1-digit level. 
Exit rates show regular spikes driven by the failing and/or restructuring of individual large firms (e.g., GIB, 
Belgium’s largest retail group and Sabena, the national flag carrier). Nevertheless, the overall trend clearly is 
declining.   
Looking at entry rates, we see a strong uptake late eighties and a subsequent decline from the early nineties. 
Although firm entry is widely studied in the literature of the 80s and the 90s, this period is unfortunately not very 
well documented for Belgium.26 We therefore scrutinize the detailed data and we see the largest decline in start-
up employment over the period 1995-1996. This coincides with the changed calculation method on how to report 
firm employment. From 1996 onwards a self-employed small business owner that actively works in the business 
is not included anymore in the reported number of employees. Most probably, this changed definition led to the 
steep drop in 1996 of the average firm size at start-up (Fig. 8a) and the number of employees at starting firms (Fig. 
                                                          
25 To maximize comparability we use the variables average employment (# heads) before 1996 and end of year 
employment (# heads) from 1996 onwards. The dynamism and skewness calculations of the previous chapter use FTE from 
1996 onwards. As a robustness check, we also study dynamism based on employment (# heads) after 1996 in Appendix B 
and come to the same conclusion, i.e. a decline in dynamism.   
26 See e.g., Geroski (1995) for an extensive overview of the empirical literature on firm entry. Specifically for Belgium, to our 
knowledge there is only to Sleuwaegen & Dehandschutter (1991) and De Backer and Sleuwaegen, (2003) who study Belgian 
start-up rates during the ‘80s and ‘90s but limit themselves to the manufacturing industry.  
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8b). The average firm size drops with approx. 0.4 employees over the period 1995-1996. Increasing the number 
of employees with 0.4 (dotted lines in Fig. 8) makes the fall in start-up employment less dramatic than Fig. 7b 
suggests. Since headcount is an overestimation of employment when part-time work is on the rise and absolute 
employment at start-ups does not take into account the overall increase of the workforce, we can still safely 
conclude that start-up activity is gradually declining after the strong increase of the late 80s, albeit at a less steep 
pace than the crude numbers suggest.  This explains why the changing age composition only counts for approx. 
1/3 of the overall dynamism decline as show in Appendix C. 
a Average firm size at start-up  b Absolute employment at start-up firms.  
  
Fig. 8 Average firm size at year of entry (a) and absolute employment at entering firms (b). Dotted line corrects for 
changed definition of employment in 1996. Entry is corrected for spurious entrants. The average firm size significantly 
reduces in 1996 (the year the definition changed) and the drop in start-up employment is less outspoken if we correct for 
this changed definition. 
The strong increase in start-up numbers late 80s is linked with regulatory changes. During the period 1985-1987 
Belgian corporate law was drastically changed. The administrative burden to start a company was reduced and it 
became possible to incorporate a legal entity with a single shareholder.27 These changes led to a strong increase in 
start-up rates from 1986 for both the number of starting firms and the employment at starting firms. As a result 
many self-employed small business owners, operating without a legal entity, switched to operating within a legal 
entity. Table 5 in Appendix A ranks NACE 2-digit sectors based on the employment they represent in the period 
of the start-up boom (1986-1992). We indeed find most start-up employment at retail and wholesale shops, 
                                                          
27 Before 1986 a single person business could only be run by a self-employed person operating without a legal entity. Profits 
of a single person business were taxed according to the (in most cases less favorable) personal income tax brackets. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs without a legal entity remain personally liable for the business’ debts in case of bankruptcy. 
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restaurants and bars and construction companies (tradesmen).   
a Relative entry/exit employment (after removal of 
top 5 start-up sectors)  
b 90-10 differential (after removal of top 5 start-up 
sectors) 
  
Fig. 9 Relative employment at firms entering/exiting as % of all firms (a) and dynamism (90-10 differentials) for all firms 
and continuing firms only (b). Entry is corrected for spurious entrants. Top-5 1986-1992 sectors with highest start-up 
employment are removed from the data. The decline in start-up and dynamism is less outspoken, but still present. 
We do not know to what extend these newly started legal entities are truly new businesses or a change of legal 
status of existing businesses. At least a part of the start-up boom of 1986-1992 will be driven by already existing 
self-employed small businessmen. In our calculations they show up as start-ups and hence increase business 
dynamism although strictly speaking this is not the case.28 Possibly, the initial increase and subsequent decline of 
business dynamism is caused by the temporary increase of incorporation of already existing businesses driven by 
regulatory changes. Fig. 9 now removes the top-5 1986-1992 start-up sectors29 from the data and show start-up 
and exit rates (Fig. 9a) as well as dynamism (Fig. 9b). The evolution of the long term trend is smoothened, but 
stays comparable. 
The decline in start-up rates of the past 2 decades is well documented and not limited to Belgium. Calvino et al. 
(2015) find this a common trend for most OECD countries. For Belgium they find that the start-up rate is very 
low, but the post-entry growth rate of survivors is the highest in the studied sample. They also find this is a common 
characteristic for nearly all NACE 2-digit sectors. Dumont & Kegels (2016) dig deeper into Belgian start-up rates 
                                                          
28 A benefit remains that, since incorporation offers far higher protection in case of bankruptcy, incorporation should 
encourage risk taking which is positive for subsequent dynamism.  
29 See Table 5 in Appendix A. The top 5 sectors are retail trade (excl. motor vehicles) (NACE 47), wholesale trade (excl. 
motor vehicles) (NACE 46), specialised construction (NACE 43), food and beverage service (NACE 56), wholesale and retail 
of motor vehicles (NACE 45). They represent 46% of start-up employment during 1986-1992. 
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and find that of the factors impacting start-ups (such as bankruptcy regulation, contract enforcement, access to 
finance and product market regulation) it seems that access to finance is the major barrier for entrants and young 
firms in Belgium. The combination of these insights might also explain why dynamism at young firms actually 
increases as potentially only the best business ideas are able to find the required financing and materialize into a 
start-up business.   
The decline in entry rates leads to a subsequent decline of employment at young firms (figure not shown) and a 
shift towards older, less dynamic firms. Next to changes of the age composition, there are also changes of the 
sectoral composition of the firm landscape.  Bijnens & Konings (2017) show that over the past decades, Belgium 
has moved a large amount of jobs from the capital intensive, goods producing manufacturing industry to more 
volatile distribution and support services. In Appendix C we analyze the effect on compositional shifts on the 
decline of the 90-10 differential as well as on the decline of alternative measures of business dynamism. We find 
that this only partially explains the aggregate decline. The changing age composition explains approx. 1/3 of the 
decline. The effect of sectoral changes is not fully clear as depending on the measure it can either cause a decline 
or rise in dynamism. In any case, taking the changing firm landscape into account, the majority of the decline in 
dynamism remains unexplained. This is confirmed by the fact that dynamism at continuing firms shows a trend 
change from increasing to declining end 90s whereas the start-up rate showed the largest decline during the 90s 
and only a moderate decline post 2000.  
 
The decline of high-growth firms  
 
We now turn to the evolution of high-growth firms (HGF) as they have a strong impact on the 90-50 differential 
and hence overall skewness of the firm growth rate distribution. While it is often claimed that small, young firms 
account for the majority of job creation, this is rebuked by Henrekson & Johansson (2010). They analyze 20 
empirical studies and find that a large share of net employment growth is generated by a few rapidly growing 
firms, so-called high-growth firms (HGFs). These HGFs are not necessarily small and young, but it is 
predominantly young age more than small size that seems to be linked with rapid growth and job creation. Geurts 
& Van Biesebroeck (2016) find that firm size at start-up seems to have some predictive power for subsequent high 
job creation. 
HGFs thus play an important role in a dynamic economy as they represent a disproportionate share of job creation. 
The Eurostat-OECD definition of high-growth requires an annualized growth rate of 20% over a three-year period 
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and ten or more employees at the beginning of the observation period. We also use an alternative definition of 
high-growth that defines all companies with a growth rate above the 90th percentile as HGFs.  
Fig. 10a first looks at high growth based on the Eurostat-OECD definition. The employment share at HGFs initially 
goes up pre-2000 and comes down post-2000. The volatility stemming from the business cycle has significantly 
come down too, with the latest downturn having only a small impact on HGF activity. Looking at the growth rate 
of the 90th percentile (Fig. 10b, bottom curve), we observe a similar trend. We now know that the decline in 
skewness and dispersion of the firm growth rate distribution is driven to a large extend by what happens to these 
fastest growing firms. P90 firms increased their growth rates in the pre-2000 period which drove the overall 90-
50 differential upwards. This was accompanied by a smaller increase of the 50-10 differential leading to an 
increase in dispersion and a small increase in skewness. Post-2000, we see a drop in the 90-50 differential which 
brought down skewness and dispersion.  
The overall trend masks the fact that the growth rate of the fastest growing young firms (P90) is significantly 
higher and actually steadily going up (Fig. 10b, top curve). High growth clearly is associated with younger firms. 
The best young firms are actually doing well, but their impact on the overall trend completely fades away since 
there is simply less activity from young firms. 
a EUROSTAT-OECD definition b P90 definition 
  
Fig. 10 Relative employment at high-growth firms (a) and growth rate of P90 for all and young firms only (b). HGF 
activity goes up pre-2000 and comes down post-2000. P90 growth rate for young firms increases. 
Although HGFs play an important role in overall employment growth and the skewness of the growth distribution, 
the impact of the decline in HGFs remains yet unknown. HGFs remain to some extend a mystery as they tend to 
come and go as “black swans” (Moreno & Coad 2015). Although there is a clear decline in HGF (and start-up) 
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activity, we do not see a direct link with overall employment. Unemployment in Belgium has remained fairly 
stable over the past decades and only experience mild fluctuations in line with the business cycle. Possibly, HGF 
activity can be linked with the quality of employment. Bachmann et al. (2017) provide some intuition on this. 
They find in German data that fast growing firms fuel their growth by poaching workers from other firms (rather 
than hiring from unemployment). Most likely they need to offer better contract terms to do so. This fuels overall 
salary growth. The decline of fast growing firms could hence offer a part of the explanation that Belgian job 
creation at the higher paying levels is coming down as shown in Bijnens & Konings (2017). 
Based on the Eurostat-OECD definition, only approx.. 1,000 companies p.a. are categorized as high-growth firms 
as only a small part of the firms landscape (~5%) meets the 10 employee threshold. As young firms are 
predominantly small, a Eurostat-OECD HGF analysis excludes most of the employment dynamics of young firms. 
Hölzl (2013) therefore uses a broader definition for high-impact firms30 (HIF) that combines relative and absolute 
growth and puts the threshold at 8 employees. We focus on high-impact firms with less than 500 employees as we 
are predominantly interested in younger firms. For larger firms, the absolute rather than the relative growth 
predominantly drives the definition of high-impact. 
Fig. 11a shows the employment at HIFs split over different size classes. The size class is defined at time t-3 to 
avoid a bias towards larger firms since per definition HIFs have experienced strong growth over the past 3 years. 
The overall trend of an increase pre-2000 and decrease post-2000 is also valid for HIFs. Underlying we see, 
however, that the smallest HIFs experience the fastest increase pre-2000 and also the fastest decrease post-2000. 
The segment of small HIFs (8-50 employees) is also likely to be the youngest sub-segment. Fig. 11b splits the 
sample between young firms (5 years or less at time t-3) and old HIF. We find that not only young HIFs experience 
a decline post-2000, but also and more importantly the older HIFs.  The decline in high-impact activity is hence 
not limited to younger firms for which the activity is highly linked with the (declining) start-up rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 High-impact firm definition: (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡 − 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡−3) (
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡−3
) ≥ 25.15968 if 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡−3 > 8 
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a Split over different firm sizes b Split over different firm age 
  
Fig. 11 Relative employment at high-impacts firms split over different firm sizes (a)  and firm age (b). Small and young 
HIFs see the sharpest increase pre-2000 and decrease post-2000. Younger and older HIFs experience a decline. Firm size 
and age is defined at t-3 
 
The role of ICT Intensity  
 
So far, we have shown that there is a clear decline in dynamism and this decline set in around the year 2000. A 
substantial part (approx.. 1/3) is driven by lower start-up rates that shifted employment towards older, less dynamic 
firms. An additional driver is the decline of employment at high-growth and high-impact firms. This decline is 
not limited to young firms (which is linked with the decline in start-up rates) and also apparent for older firms. 
What exactly caused the decline in start-up and high-growth activity remains, however, yet unknown. 
Decker et al. (2016) see a U.S. dynamism trend change that set in around the year 2000. Since Belgium and the 
U.S., two very different economies,31 exhibit similar trends with respect to dynamism, global changes affecting 
all countries rather than country specific changes are likely to have played a role.32 Possible global changes are 
the increasing use of ICT or increased globalization. In this paragraph we explore the impact of ICT. In the next 
paragraph we briefly study globalization. 
Several authors already confirmed that a substantial part of the U.S. growth acceleration from 1995 to 2000 is 
driven by the adoption of ICT (Jorgenson et al., 2003;  Daveri, 2003). Van Ark (2015) states this was also the case 
for Europe, though less outspoken compared to the U.S. Van Reenen et al. (2010) link ICT with reallocation of 
                                                          
31 Also note that Belgium, contrary to the U.S., did not experience a significant Internet boom and bust around 2000. 
32 Note that this is in line with Goldschlag & Tabarrok (2018) who show that increased regulation (which is country specific) 
is not to blame for the decline of U.S. business dynamism. 
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employment and find firms with higher levels of ICT are more likely to grow and less likely to exit.  
Several classifications for industries exist based on their level of innovation or high-tech content. We find that 
these definitions do not capture very well the impact of the ICT revolution.33 For instance, wholesale and retail 
activities are generally not classified as highly innovative, nevertheless the use of ICT dramatically increased and 
has become a key success driver of this industry. To capture the impact of ICT, we use the EU KLEMS 
Productivity and Growth Accounts on industry level for Belgium.34 The dataset provides us with the change in 
contribution of ICT capital services to value added growth on an aggregation level between NACE 1-digit and 2-
digit.35 We assume the industries with the highest contribution between 2000 and 2014 are the ones that were most 
affected by the ICT revolution that set in during the second half of the ’90s.36 Companies in these sectors who did 
not successfully invest in ICT, saw (compared to other industries) a disproportionate impact on their value added 
growth and were hence more likely to stagnate or disappear. As acquiring ICT knowledge and infrastructure is, to 
a certain extent, a fixed cost, smaller companies are more likely to miss out on the ICT revolution which could 
ultimately result in a loss in business dynamism as a limited number of successful companies become more 
dominant in an industry.  
Fig. 12a shows the evolution of dynamism (captured by the 90-10 differential) for ICT intensive vs. non-intensive 
industries. Both see an initial uptake in dynamism linked with the increased start-up rate of the 2nd half of the 80s. 
Subsequently the non-ICT intensive industries experience a slow, continuous decline throughout the studied 
period. ICT intensive industries, however, show a strong increase in dynamism until the second half of the ’90s 
followed by an even stronger decrease. The overall pattern of a change in dynamism in the late 90s is clearly 
driven by the ICT intensive industries. This is not contradictory to Van Reenen et  al. (2010) who have shown that 
firms investing more in ICT grow more in employment. The initial uptake of ICT will cause increased reallocation 
from firms not investing in ICT to firms investing in ICT which initially leads to an increase of business dynamism. 
                                                          
33 We have analyzed the different measures of dynamism for different industries based on Eurostat’s classification of high-
tech vs. low-tech manufacturing industries and knowledge intensive vs. less knowledge intensive services. This yielded little 
additional insight. 
34 See Jäger (2017) for an explanation of the EU KLEMS project and its data sources. 
35 Several 2-digit industries are taken together resulting in 29 different industries instead of the 88 NACE 2-digit industries. 
36 Via this methodology we categorize the following NACE sections or industries as ICT intensive (all other industries, we 
regard as non-ICT intensive): IT and other information services (62-63), Telecommunications (61), Publishing, audiovisual 
and broadcasting activities (58-60), Professional, scientific, technical administrative and support service activities (M-N), 
Financial and insurance activities (K), Wholesale and retail trade (G), Arts, entertainment and recreation (R), Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. (28), Chemicals and chemical products (20-21), Coke and refined petroleum products (19), Electricity, gas 
and water supply (D-E). 
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The ICT investing firms will become larger and more productive and push the smaller, less productive firms out 
of the market. The surviving firms become the “superstar firms” of their industries potentially causing a subsequent 
decline in business dynamism. Dhyne et al. (2018) show that actually only a small number of larger firms benefit 
from productivity increasing ICT investments, especially within the services industry. 
a All industries B Manufacturing vs. services 
  
Fig. 12 90-10 differential split by level of ICT intensity for all industries (a) and for manufacturing and services separately 
(b). The dynamism increase pre-2000 and decline post-2000 is predominantly driven by high ICT intensive industries. 
 
One could argue that in Fig. 12a, we do not observe the difference in ICT intensity, but rather a difference services 
vs. manufacturing as services are over represented in the ICT intensive industries. Therefore, in Figure  Fig. 12b  
we explicitly make the ICT intensity split for manufacturing and services. Even within the services and the 
manufacturing industries, there is a clear difference of the ICT intensive industries vis-a-vis the non-ICT intensive 
ones. For both services and manufacturing, the ICT intensive industries exhibit the overall pattern of a change in 
dynamism towards the end of the 90s, whilst the non-ICT intensive industries show a slower decline and do not 
experience a trend change in the years leading to 2000. 
Fig. 13 looks at the combination of firm age and ICT intensity and its effect on the fastest growing companies 
(P90).  Apart from the initial strong decline at low ICT intensive services (linked with the decline in firm entry), 
the growth rate of the 90th percentile for young firms (Fig. 13a) shows a rather flat evolution.  Fig. 13b also shows 
the P90 growth rate for old firms. The decline in dynamism for older firms, especially older services firms, is very 
outspoken. We find the steepest decline with high ICT intensive services. This shows again that the decline in 
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dynamism is not purely linked to a decline of activity at younger firms.  
We cannot claim (yet) the causes of the decline in business dynamism are linked with the increased use of complex 
ICT systems during the second half of the ’90s. Nevertheless, we find some preliminary indications that whether 
or not an industry has a high ICT intensity is somehow linked with the decline in business dynamism. This topic 
needs further, more detailed research. 
a Young firms b Old firms 
  
Fig. 13 P90 split by level of ICT intensity, young firms (a) and old firms (b). The especially the decline at older services 
firms is very outspoken 
 
The role of foreign direct investment  
 
 
The steep increase in globalization of the past decades had indeed substantial effects on the firm landscape. The  
Melitz (2003) model already implied only the best firms will participate in the export market and will become 
better an push out weaker firms. Bernard et al. (2007) document how increased international trade and investment 
affects the strategy and structure of incumbent firms across industries. Globalization comes in many forms and we 
therefore study one specific part of globalization highly relevant for Belgium, a small and very open economy: the 
increased importance of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and the presence of foreign multinational 
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corporations (MNC).37 
According to UNCTAD data, the inward FDI stock of developed economies increased more than tenfold over the 
period 1990-2014. Belgium too, receives substantial foreign direct investment. OECD (2014) puts the 2011 stock 
of inward Belgian FDI at 200% of GDP. This ratio ranks Belgium 2nd of all OECD countries, behind Luxembourg. 
It is therefore fair to say, inward foreign investment plays a very important role for Belgium’s firm landscape and 
hence for its business dynamism.  
Aitken and Harrison (1999) already drew attention to the fact that, although inward FDI leads to technology 
spillovers (benefiting domestic entrepreneurship), more efficient foreign firms may “steal” the market of domestic 
firms.  This leads over time to a less competitive firm landscape. The fear that foreign MNCs monopolize domestic 
markets has certainly not ebbed way since their research. De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003)38 studied this topic 
specifically for Belgium. They analyze entry and exit across Belgian manufacturing industries and find that FDI 
indeed discourages entry and stimulates exit of domestic entrepreneurs. However, their empirical results also show 
that this crowding out effect is moderated or even reversed in the long-run due to the long term positive effects of 
FDI on domestic entrepreneurship as a result of learning and linkage effects between foreign and domestic firms. 
In addition Duprez and Van Nieuwenhuyze (2016) point out that, at least for the case of Belgium, an economic 
crisis affects employment at subsidiaries of foreign MNCs to a greater extent than employment at domestic firms. 
To study the impact of MNC activity on dynamism we have obtained confidential data from the NBB’s survey on 
foreign direct investment. This data list all firms that are directly or indirectly foreign owned.39 We have linked 
this information with employment information to come to a “MNC presence” per NACE 2-digit sector. A sector 
with high MNC presence has a high share of employment at firms with foreign ownership. Table 5 in Appendix 
A shows the details and ranks the sectors based on MNC presence. We split our data between sectors with high 
(representing 50% of employment) and the sectors with a low MNC presence (representing 50% of employment). 
 
 
                                                          
37 We do not specifically study the possible increased Belgian employment at Belgian MNCs driven by headquarter services 
delivered to non-Belgian affiliates. This increased employment does show up in the employment figures we use, but we 
have no information on whether these employees work specifically for the Belgian market of for the foreign market. 
38 More recent research on linkages between FDI and entry/exit rates unfortunately focusses on developing and 
transitional economies. 
39 This survey is conducted since 1997. Based on, amongst others, annual account data, the NBB selects the surveyed firms. 
Response to the FDI survey is mandatory if 10% of the firm’s equity is directly or indirectly held by a foreign entity or 
individual. 
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a All industries B Manufacturing vs. services 
  
Fig. 14 90-10 differential split by level of MNC presence (high vs. low, see Table 5 in Appendix A). Overall the 
dynamism drop is predominantly driven by sectors with low MNC presence. Comparing manufacturing with services, we 
see that the initial rise in dynamism is driven by services with high MNC presence. These services show a remarkable 
trend changes second half of the 90s. Source: authors’ analysis based on NBB FDI survey data.  
 
Fig. 14 shows the evolution of dynamism (captured by the 90-10 differential). Fig. 14a shows that sectors with 
low MNC presence show higher dynamism, but also show a steeper decline that sets in the 2nd half of the 90s. As 
most manufacturing sectors have a high MNC presence, Fig. 14b makes the split between manufacturing and 
services. Both services and manufacturing, independent of high or low MNC presence, show a decline in 
dynamism. The most remarkable finding is that services with high MNC presence show the most outspoken trend 
change around 2000. Services with low MNC presence, show a steep decline around 2000. A possible linkage 
between MNC presence and dynamism seems only to be present in the services sector. Bearing in mind, however, 
we only take into account MNC activity from 1997, the question whether an increased MNC presence had an 
impact on dynamism in services sectors needs further study. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
 
 
We find clear evidence that the secular decline in business dynamism is not limited to the U.S., a highly 
entrepreneurial economy where dynamism started from a high base. Business dynamism is declining in Belgium 
as well, an economy with a rigid labor market and where the levels of entrepreneurship are significantly lower 
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than in the U.S. We do not see a “revert to the mean” or convergence with respect to business dynamism where 
highly dynamic economies are hampered by increasing legislation and rigid economies become more 
entrepreneurial driven by structural reforms.  
We find that the decline of Belgium business dynamism set in around the year 2000. This follows a decade of 
declining start-up rates that shifted the composition of the firm landscape to older, less volatile firms. We estimate 
this age effect to explain up to 1/3 of the aggregate dynamism decline. The dynamism decline is predominantly 
driven by a sustained decrease of the 90-50 differential of the firm growth rate distribution. The declining 90-50 
differential is closely linked with the activity of the so called high-growth firms. We find a declining propensity 
for small (not necessarily young) firms to experience fast growth. 
Although the causes of the above changes remain yet unknown, they are likely to be found in global trends 
affecting (developed) economies in a similar way. Potential candidates could be the increased use of ICT and its 
impact on productivity gains or increased globalization. 
With respect to ICT as a cause for the decline in dynamism, we offer preliminary evidence that the ICT intensity 
of an industry is linked with the gravity of the decline in business dynamism. As our findings are based on a rather 
crude split of industries based on ICT intensity, this remains an area to further research. 
With respect to globalization, we briefly study the impact on dynamism from the increased presence of 
multinational companies (MNCs) and find mixed results. While industries with the highest presence of MNCs 
show low dynamism, the drop in dynamism is actually significantly higher for industries with a low MNC 
presence. Nevertheless, services industries with a high MNC presence show the strongest dynamism trend change. 
The reasons for this, however, remain a topic for further research as well. 
We also see that the volatility of the 90-50 and 50-10 differentials is declining with each business cycle. Firms are 
becoming less and less diverse from a growth rate perspective. Firms increasingly resemble each other. Whether 
or not this goes hand in hand with decreasing diversity in productivity in Belgium remains to be investigated. 
Andrews et al. (2016) already showed dispersion in productivity within NACE 2-digit sectors is actually 
increasing. 
Reallocation of (human) resources towards the most efficient and productive firms is an important driver for 
overall productivity growth. The fact that there is less activity at (small) high-growth firms might be due to the 
simple fact that resources are already allocated to the most productive (larger) firms. If this is the case, the 
dynamism decline is not necessarily negative for overall productivity growth. 
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Other research indicates that younger firms on average invest more in innovation. If high growth is more and more 
associated with larger firms this might also mean that they are more and more able to shield themselves from 
creative destruction driven by younger, smaller and potentially more innovative firms. This implies a negative 
effect on aggregate productivity. An alternative and less worrying explanation could be that smaller, disruptive 
firms are more likely to be acquired by incumbent firms and they continue their innovation supported by the 
resources and the management knowledge of the incumbent. In any case, the research on the decline in business 
dynamism should not be seen independently from the recent studies on the increased performance and power of 
the so called “superstar firms”. Understanding what caused the Belgian decline in business dynamism and high-
growth firm activity is a topic for future research.  
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics of data 
 
Table 2: Overview of number of firms (with and without turnover) per year in the dataset split over different 
NACE Rev. 2 1-digit sections.  
Table 3: Relative firm entry and exit rates per NACE Rev. 2 1-digit section in # of firms entering/exiting as ‰ 
of all firms.  
Table 4: Relative firm entry and exit rates per NACE Rev. 2 1-digit section in # of employees entering/exiting as 
‰ of all firms.  
Table 5: Share of employment (FTE) at firms with partial or whole foreign ownership (direct and indirect) per 
year and split over NACE 2-digit sector.  
Table 6: Employment at start-up firms during 1986 – 1992 (# employees in year of start-up) split over NACE 
Rev.2 2-digit sectors and ranked based on employment (largest to smallest). 
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1985 91.3 54.4 2.4 1.4 13.2 8.5 0.3 0.3 9.4 5.6 33.0 19.9 4.5 2.9 2.9 1.7 1.7 1.1 3.9 1.7 3.0 1.7 6.5 3.7 4.6 2.6 5.8 3.2 
1986 104.6 56.1 2.8 1.5 14.6 8.6 0.4 0.3 10.5 5.6 37.5 20.4 5.0 2.9 3.5 1.8 2.1 1.1 4.4 1.8 3.8 1.9 7.6 3.9 5.2 2.7 7.3 3.6 
1987 116.8 63.5 3.3 1.8 15.6 9.2 0.4 0.3 11.6 6.4 41.1 22.5 5.3 3.2 4.1 2.2 2.4 1.4 4.8 2.1 4.4 2.2 9.1 4.8 5.7 3.0 9.0 4.6 
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1991 178.5 83.8 7.1 3.4 20.0 10.3 0.5 0.3 17.3 8.3 55.9 26.7 7.1 3.7 6.6 3.1 4.2 2.0 7.2 3.0 8.9 3.7 17.4 8.0 8.5 3.9 17.6 7.5 
1992 193.3 90.0 8.0 3.7 20.7 10.7 0.6 0.3 18.6 9.1 58.9 27.9 7.4 3.9 7.3 3.4 4.6 2.2 7.7 3.2 10.5 4.2 19.3 8.6 9.1 4.1 20.8 8.8 
1993 204.1 90.2 7.8 3.4 21.0 10.3 0.6 0.3 19.7 9.1 61.5 27.9 7.6 3.8 8.0 3.5 4.6 2.0 9.3 3.6 14.6 5.6 20.7 8.7 9.9 4.3 18.8 7.7 
1994 212.4 90.9 3.9 1.5 23.3 11.2 1.2 0.7 21.1 9.3 68.1 30.0 6.5 3.2 10.1 4.4 4.8 2.1 9.5 3.7 19.5 7.5 20.7 8.3 8.9 3.7 14.8 5.3 
1995 221.2 92.2 3.6 1.4 23.7 11.1 1.3 0.7 22.2 9.5 70.7 30.1 6.6 3.2 11.0 4.7 5.1 2.2 9.8 3.8 20.5 7.6 22.0 8.6 9.7 4.0 14.7 5.4 
1996 231.4 93.6 3.3 1.3 23.9 10.9 1.4 0.7 23.2 9.7 72.9 30.2 6.9 3.2 11.9 4.9 5.6 2.4 10.6 3.9 21.4 7.7 23.8 9.1 10.7 4.1 15.7 5.6 
1997 241.0 98.6 3.3 1.3 23.9 11.0 1.5 0.8 24.4 10.3 74.7 31.2 7.2 3.4 12.6 5.3 6.1 2.7 11.2 4.1 22.0 7.9 25.8 9.9 11.2 4.4 16.8 6.2 
1998 250.6 101.1 3.4 1.4 24.2 11.0 1.4 0.7 25.5 10.6 76.8 31.7 7.6 3.5 13.6 5.8 6.8 3.0 11.6 4.1 22.6 7.9 27.9 10.5 11.5 4.6 17.8 6.5 
1999 260.5 104.4 3.5 1.4 24.5 11.1 1.5 0.7 26.6 11.1 78.5 32.3 8.0 3.7 14.3 6.0 7.6 3.3 12.4 4.2 23.2 8.0 29.9 11.1 11.8 4.7 18.7 6.8 
2000 270.9 103.4 3.6 1.3 24.5 10.7 1.5 0.7 27.8 10.9 79.7 31.4 8.3 3.6 14.9 6.0 8.6 3.5 13.3 4.3 24.2 8.0 32.4 11.4 12.2 4.8 19.9 6.8 
2001 280.1 100.8 3.7 1.4 24.4 10.2 1.5 0.7 29.0 10.9 80.0 30.0 8.6 3.7 15.4 5.8 9.7 3.8 14.4 4.2 25.1 7.6 34.6 11.2 12.5 4.6 21.1 6.9 
2002 290.5 101.5 3.8 1.4 24.3 10.0 1.6 0.7 30.2 10.9 80.1 29.4 9.0 3.7 16.2 5.9 10.6 4.0 15.5 4.3 26.2 7.6 37.0 11.6 13.3 4.8 22.8 7.3 
2003 299.8 99.3 3.9 1.3 24.1 9.5 1.5 0.7 31.2 10.6 80.8 28.3 9.3 3.7 16.9 6.0 11.1 4.0 16.3 4.2 27.2 7.3 39.4 11.6 13.6 4.7 24.3 7.3 
2004 309.5 98.3 4.2 1.4 23.7 9.0 1.4 0.6 32.6 10.5 81.6 27.6 9.9 3.9 18.0 6.1 11.9 4.1 16.9 4.2 28.0 7.3 41.7 11.7 13.6 4.4 25.9 7.5 
2005 319.4 90.1 4.4 1.3 23.3 8.0 1.3 0.5 34.5 9.9 82.0 24.9 10.5 3.7 19.1 5.7 12.5 3.8 17.8 4.0 28.7 6.5 43.9 10.6 13.9 4.1 27.5 7.1 
2006 331.0 83.3 4.6 1.2 23.3 7.3 1.1 0.5 36.5 9.3 82.8 22.7 10.9 3.5 19.8 5.3 13.1 3.6 18.9 3.8 29.8 5.9 46.6 9.9 14.2 3.7 29.3 6.6 
2007 344.8 81.2 4.8 1.2 23.6 7.1 1.1 0.5 39.2 9.5 84.6 21.6 11.5 3.5 20.7 5.1 14.1 3.6 19.7 3.8 30.3 5.7 50.0 9.8 14.8 3.6 30.4 6.4 
2008 359.2 77.2 5.0 1.0 23.8 6.8 1.2 0.5 41.7 9.1 85.3 20.2 11.8 3.4 21.3 4.8 15.1 3.5 20.9 3.6 31.3 5.4 53.7 9.4 15.6 3.5 32.4 6.1 
2009 371.8 73.0 5.4 1.0 23.8 6.3 1.3 0.5 43.9 8.7 86.0 18.8 12.0 3.3 21.8 4.5 15.9 3.4 21.8 3.3 32.4 5.1 57.3 9.0 16.1 3.4 34.2 5.7 
2010 382.5 70.5 5.5 0.9 23.7 6.0 1.4 0.5 45.3 8.3 86.3 17.9 11.9 3.2 22.1 4.3 16.5 3.3 22.6 3.2 33.4 5.1 60.2 8.7 16.5 3.3 37.2 5.6 
2011 395.5 80.2 5.6 1.0 23.7 6.4 1.5 0.5 47.3 9.7 87.1 19.7 12.0 3.4 22.7 5.0 17.4 3.9 23.6 3.8 34.2 5.6 63.6 10.5 17.3 3.9 39.5 6.8 
2012 406.2 83.0 5.8 1.0 23.7 6.4 1.6 0.6 49.2 10.3 87.6 19.9 12.1 3.5 23.1 5.3 18.2 4.1 24.4 4.0 34.9 5.7 66.9 11.3 17.9 4.0 40.9 7.0 
2013 410.1 63.1 5.8 0.7 23.6 5.3 1.6 0.5 50.0 7.5 87.0 15.9 12.0 3.0 23.4 3.9 18.6 3.0 24.7 3.0 34.9 4.5 68.1 7.8 18.1 3.1 42.2 5.0 
2014 407.4 57.4 6.0 0.7 23.1 5.0 1.6 0.5 50.4 6.7 85.5 14.6 11.9 2.8 23.5 3.4 18.7 2.7 24.5 2.7 35.2 4.1 68.5 6.9 18.3 2.9 40.1 4.4 
Table 2: Overview of number of firms per year in the dataset split over different NACE Rev. 2 1-digit sections. Table includes both the total number of firms (“All”) and the  
number of firms reporting turnover (“With turn.”). The number of firms gradually increases over the time period. The number of firms reporting turnover declines from the 
early 2000s. 
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 Entry Exit. Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit. Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit 
1985 30.6 50.2 1.6 1.5 2.7 5.6 0.1 0.2 3.0 4.4 9.6 17.0 1.1 1.5 1.3 2.4 0.8 1.2 0.9 5.0 0.8 0.5 2.5 3.4 1.6 3.2 4.7 4.4 
1986 135.3 37.0 5.8 1.3 11.4 4.6 0.3 0.1 10.6 3.1 45.3 12.6 4.5 1.8 6.4 1.9 3.8 1.1 6.3 2.3 5.6 0.3 11.2 2.4 6.9 2.3 17.1 3.3 
1987 140.1 41.7 6.2 1.3 11.6 4.7 0.3 0.1 12.6 3.3 43.3 14.7 4.5 1.9 6.6 2.3 4.3 1.3 6.0 2.2 4.1 0.4 14.0 2.9 6.5 2.3 20.1 4.3 
1988 139.2 42.3 7.3 1.6 11.0 5.0 0.2 0.1 12.0 3.2 38.7 14.0 4.4 2.2 6.4 2.1 4.0 1.3 4.8 2.1 3.9 0.4 14.7 3.5 6.0 2.4 25.7 4.5 
1989 138.9 41.4 9.3 1.7 10.5 4.9 0.3 0.1 11.9 3.5 36.3 13.8 4.3 1.9 6.3 1.8 3.7 1.2 4.3 2.0 3.0 0.3 15.4 3.3 6.0 2.4 27.6 4.4 
1990 134.0 38.6 10.3 1.7 9.2 4.4 0.2 0.1 11.3 3.3 33.6 12.1 4.6 2.0 5.8 1.7 3.7 1.3 3.8 1.3 3.7 0.4 16.3 3.6 6.8 2.4 24.6 4.2 
1991 123.4 43.9 10.3 2.4 8.3 4.7 0.2 0.1 10.8 3.7 30.1 13.8 4.1 1.9 5.4 2.1 4.0 1.5 3.3 1.7 3.5 0.5 14.9 4.3 5.7 2.5 22.9 4.6 
1992 113.4 44.8 8.6 2.5 6.8 4.6 0.2 0.1 9.5 4.0 25.6 13.0 3.2 2.0 4.9 2.1 3.0 1.7 3.2 1.6 3.9 0.5 13.0 4.4 4.8 2.6 26.7 5.8 
1993 94.9 40.8 5.0 2.0 5.6 3.7 0.2 0.1 7.7 3.5 22.8 12.0 2.7 1.6 4.6 2.2 2.3 1.1 4.1 2.5 8.6 0.7 10.5 3.9 5.2 2.5 15.5 5.0 
1994 79.8 37.4 1.2 0.9 5.4 4.0 0.7 0.2 8.3 3.2 22.6 13.6 1.9 0.9 5.7 3.1 2.1 1.0 3.1 1.1 6.4 1.6 9.3 2.6 6.6 2.2 6.5 3.0 
1995 76.6 38.6 1.3 0.9 4.8 4.3 0.5 0.3 8.0 3.3 22.3 13.8 2.1 0.9 6.2 3.1 2.2 0.8 3.1 1.3 4.6 1.5 9.3 2.9 6.7 2.8 5.6 2.6 
1996 80.6 32.7 1.1 0.7 4.9 3.2 0.6 0.3 7.4 2.7 22.5 11.9 2.0 0.7 6.4 2.4 2.8 0.8 4.3 1.3 4.4 1.4 10.5 2.5 7.5 3.1 6.3 1.8 
1997 80.0 36.4 1.0 0.7 4.5 3.2 0.5 0.2 7.8 3.3 22.5 12.6 2.1 0.8 6.3 2.9 3.0 1.0 3.7 1.6 4.0 1.6 11.5 3.0 5.7 3.4 7.2 2.1 
1998 71.2 35.6 0.9 0.6 4.1 3.2 0.4 0.3 7.3 3.0 20.3 12.4 1.9 0.8 6.0 3.0 3.2 1.2 3.0 1.7 3.3 1.5 10.8 3.4 4.2 2.7 5.7 2.0 
1999 71.1 36.7 0.9 0.6 4.1 3.3 0.4 0.3 7.3 3.0 19.5 13.0 2.0 0.8 6.0 3.0 4.0 1.2 3.7 1.6 3.2 1.5 11.2 3.5 3.7 2.7 4.9 2.1 
2000 72.2 38.5 0.9 0.5 3.6 3.4 0.4 0.3 7.3 3.5 17.8 13.5 1.8 0.9 5.5 3.0 4.9 1.6 4.4 1.7 4.1 1.6 12.3 3.8 3.9 2.4 5.4 2.1 
2001 68.7 34.9 0.8 0.4 3.3 3.1 0.4 0.3 7.2 3.2 15.8 11.6 1.8 1.0 5.1 2.9 5.3 1.8 4.6 1.5 3.7 1.5 11.9 3.5 3.4 2.3 5.5 1.8 
2002 69.6 32.5 0.7 0.3 2.9 2.8 0.6 0.3 7.1 3.0 15.1 11.0 1.8 0.7 5.6 3.0 4.9 1.5 4.5 1.4 4.4 1.3 11.7 3.2 3.5 2.3 6.7 1.6 
2003 63.1 31.1 0.6 0.3 2.5 2.7 0.4 0.4 6.4 2.8 13.8 9.7 1.9 0.6 5.5 2.8 3.5 1.5 4.0 1.9 4.1 1.3 11.0 3.2 3.2 2.1 6.1 1.7 
2004 61.9 32.4 0.8 0.3 2.7 2.7 0.2 0.3 6.6 2.9 13.8 10.3 1.6 0.7 5.6 3.3 3.6 1.5 3.2 1.7 3.9 1.6 10.7 3.4 2.7 1.9 6.5 1.7 
2005 62.0 29.2 0.9 0.3 2.6 2.1 0.2 0.3 7.6 2.9 13.2 9.3 1.8 0.8 5.6 3.1 3.4 1.4 3.5 1.4 3.8 1.4 10.6 2.9 2.6 1.8 6.4 1.5 
2006 63.7 29.7 0.7 0.3 2.7 2.2 0.2 0.3 8.3 3.1 12.7 9.2 1.6 0.8 5.4 3.2 3.2 1.3 4.3 1.5 4.2 1.5 10.9 3.0 2.8 1.7 6.7 1.6 
2007 67.8 30.0 1.0 0.3 2.9 2.1 0.3 0.1 10.4 3.6 13.9 8.8 2.1 1.3 5.7 3.3 4.1 1.2 3.9 1.4 2.9 1.5 12.7 3.2 3.4 1.4 4.5 1.9 
2008 68.8 30.2 0.8 0.3 2.7 2.2 0.3 0.1 10.9 3.5 13.1 8.1 2.1 1.4 5.4 3.3 4.6 1.3 3.9 1.7 2.9 1.5 13.7 3.4 3.8 1.5 4.7 1.9 
2009 64.4 30.2 0.9 0.3 2.4 2.0 0.3 0.1 9.8 3.8 11.6 8.1 1.9 1.4 5.1 3.2 3.9 1.3 3.6 1.7 3.1 1.6 13.6 3.6 3.6 1.6 4.8 1.7 
2010 59.0 30.7 0.6 0.2 2.1 1.9 0.3 0.1 8.1 3.9 10.7 8.1 1.4 1.3 4.6 3.1 3.3 1.2 3.4 1.7 3.0 1.8 11.9 3.8 3.2 1.5 6.3 2.1 
2011 64.4 33.3 0.6 0.2 2.2 2.0 0.4 0.1 9.0 4.4 11.3 8.3 1.6 1.3 4.7 3.2 3.7 1.4 4.1 1.9 3.5 1.9 12.9 4.3 3.5 1.7 7.0 2.5 
2012 60.5 36.3 0.6 0.3 2.1 2.2 0.3 0.2 9.0 4.7 10.2 8.7 1.5 1.3 4.6 3.2 3.7 1.6 3.9 2.0 3.4 2.2 12.7 5.4 3.3 1.8 5.2 2.7 
2013 49.3 45.7 0.5 0.4 1.9 2.5 0.3 0.1 7.2 5.5 8.7 9.7 1.3 1.3 4.3 3.1 3.1 2.3 2.7 3.0 2.3 2.6 9.5 8.6 2.6 2.1 4.9 4.6 
2014 45.7 39.2 0.5 0.4 1.7 2.0 0.2 0.2 6.6 4.6 8.3 9.1 1.2 1.3 4.1 2.9 3.1 1.9 2.4 2.7 1.9 3.0 9.8 6.5 2.4 1.8 3.6 2.7 
Table 3: Relative firm entry and exit rates per NACE Rev. 2 1-digit section in # of firms entering/exiting as ‰ of all firms. Entry is corrected for spurious entrants. 
Initially there is a strong uptake in entry late eighties followed by a continuous decline from the early nineties. 
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 Entry Exit. Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit 
1985 2.7 21.7 0.1 0.5 0.4 8.6 0.0 0.1 0.4 2.5 0.9 5.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.3 0.1 0.7 0.3 1.5 
1986 14.2 20.5 0.5 0.2 1.9 9.2 0.1 1.9 1.6 1.8 5.2 3.1 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.4 1.3 1.2 
1987 13.4 26.7 0.4 0.6 1.6 10.2 0.0 0.0 1.9 2.1 4.5 8.2 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.5 
1988 14.1 30.5 0.4 0.8 1.8 16.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 1.9 4.3 4.7 0.7 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.3 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.3 
1989 14.9 38.7 0.7 0.3 1.8 17.6 0.0 5.2 2.2 2.2 4.6 5.1 0.7 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.1 0.1 0.0 1.3 1.4 0.5 0.6 1.5 2.8 
1990 15.5 46.9 0.7 0.5 1.8 20.4 0.1 0.4 2.2 3.0 4.6 5.5 0.8 11.4 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.0 1.5 1.4 0.6 0.8 1.6 1.7 
1991 15.6 26.6 0.8 0.6 1.7 9.8 0.0 0.0 2.4 3.2 4.3 5.4 0.7 1.8 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.5 1.6 0.6 0.9 1.7 1.5 
1992 15.9 24.2 0.7 0.4 1.5 7.3 0.0 0.1 2.2 3.4 4.4 5.6 0.7 1.8 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.5 1.6 0.5 1.1 2.4 1.2 
1993 14.2 20.9 0.5 0.5 1.3 7.1 0.0 0.1 1.9 3.2 3.9 4.3 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0 1.3 1.2 0.6 0.9 2.0 1.1 
1994 12.3 33.1 0.1 0.5 1.2 5.7 0.1 0.2 1.8 3.3 3.9 17.9 0.4 0.6 1.3 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.8 1.7 0.7 0.6 
1995 12.7 23.8 0.2 0.2 1.1 8.0 0.0 0.2 1.9 2.2 3.9 5.4 0.5 3.8 1.5 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 
1996 9.0 16.7 0.1 0.3 0.9 5.9 0.1 0.1 1.2 2.0 2.7 4.2 0.3 0.3 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 
1997 8.6 25.0 0.1 0.2 0.8 5.1 0.0 0.1 1.2 1.7 2.5 12.2 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.4 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 1.3 0.5 0.9 
1998 8.1 18.8 0.1 0.2 0.8 4.8 0.0 0.2 1.1 1.8 2.5 5.0 0.3 0.4 1.2 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.2 0.4 2.8 0.4 0.3 
1999 8.0 21.8 0.1 0.3 0.7 5.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 1.9 2.3 4.6 0.4 0.9 1.1 1.5 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.8 2.1 0.4 3.2 0.5 0.6 
2000 7.4 23.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 4.8 0.0 0.2 1.0 2.0 2.1 4.4 0.3 4.6 0.9 0.9 0.4 2.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.4 1.7 0.5 0.7 
2001 7.1 21.2 0.1 0.2 0.6 4.4 0.0 0.2 1.0 2.2 1.9 4.2 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.4 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 2.2 0.3 3.7 0.5 0.6 
2002 7.3 17.4 0.1 0.0 0.5 4.1 0.0 0.4 0.9 2.2 2.0 5.3 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.4 0.5 0.5 
2003 6.8 17.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 3.8 0.0 0.5 0.8 3.1 1.9 3.3 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.5 1.1 
2004 7.2 14.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 3.2 0.0 0.1 0.9 1.6 2.0 3.1 0.2 0.5 1.2 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.3 1.5 0.5 0.9 
2005 6.9 16.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 3.3 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.5 1.8 3.5 0.3 0.3 1.3 0.8 0.2 2.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.2 0.3 1.8 0.5 0.6 
2006 7.2 14.7 0.1 0.1 0.5 3.3 0.0 0.3 1.1 1.7 1.8 3.4 0.3 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.3 1.6 0.6 1.1 
2007 7.4 15.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 3.2 0.0 0.1 1.3 2.1 1.7 2.9 0.3 1.6 1.1 1.5 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.4 1.5 0.6 0.5 
2008 7.4 16.6 0.1 0.2 0.4 3.1 0.0 0.1 1.3 2.1 1.8 2.7 0.3 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.3 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.1 0.4 2.8 0.5 0.9 
2009 7.2 18.7 0.1 0.1 0.5 3.2 0.0 0.2 1.3 2.0 1.7 3.2 0.2 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.2 2.8 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.6 0.3 1.9 0.6 0.7 
2010 6.4 16.6 0.1 0.1 0.4 3.6 0.0 0.1 1.0 2.0 1.5 3.3 0.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.4 2.3 0.6 0.9 
2011 6.9 16.9 0.1 0.1 0.4 3.1 0.0 0.2 1.2 2.4 1.7 2.9 0.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.3 0.4 2.5 0.6 1.2 
2012 6.2 18.7 0.1 0.2 0.3 2.3 0.0 0.2 1.1 2.4 1.5 3.4 0.2 1.3 1.1 1.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 3.9 0.4 1.8 0.4 1.1 
2013 5.3 15.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.9 1.2 3.3 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1 0.3 2.8 0.4 0.9 
2014 5.5 16.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 2.5 0.0 0.1 0.8 1.8 1.3 4.1 0.2 0.9 1.2 1.5 0.2 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1 0.3 1.4 0.4 0.9 
Table 4: Relative firm entry and exit rates per NACE Rev. 2 1-digit section in # of employees entering/exiting as ‰ of all firms. Entry is corrected for spurious entrants. 
Initially there is a strong uptake in entry late eighties followed by a continuous decline from the early nineties. There is a strong drop in 1995 – 1996 linked with the changed 
definition of number of employees.  
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NACE 2-digit sector 
Employment Share of employment (FTE) at firms with foreign ownership  
Share Cumul. Average 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
19 Coke and refined petroleum products 0.2% 0.2% 94% 61% 65% 96% 95% 98% 99% 99% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 100% 100% 94% 93% 92% 
21 Pharmaceutical products 1.0% 1.2% 79% 66% 69% 71% 71% 71% 71% 72% 74% 77% 80% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 87% 87% 87% 
29 Motor vehicles 1.8% 3.1% 72% 70% 71% 69% 69% 78% 78% 78% 78% 75% 73% 74% 72% 70% 70% 70% 70% 71% 68% 
20 Chemicals and chemical products 2.6% 5.7% 69% 58% 64% 71% 71% 73% 74% 75% 72% 64% 66% 69% 70% 74% 70% 69% 68% 66% 66% 
24 Basic metals 1.9% 7.6% 67% 41% 40% 65% 67% 71% 75% 77% 66% 73% 73% 77% 76% 74% 67% 66% 67% 65% 64% 
12 Tobacco products 0.1% 7.7% 63% 61% 71% 72% 68% 66% 64% 69% 66% 62% 60% 58% 50% 52% 71% 71% 55% 54% 67% 
35 Electricity Gas steam supply 1.1% 8.8% 63% 84% 83% 80% 78% 75% 74% 79% 79% 81% 60% 59% 48% 46% 40% 43% 41% 40% 41% 
26 Computer electronic and optical products 1.0% 9.8% 61% 71% 69% 64% 64% 72% 71% 67% 44% 58% 66% 56% 56% 57% 54% 59% 59% 60% 59% 
51 Air transport 0.4% 10.1% 59% 89% 90% 86% 88% 65% 52% 50% 60% 49% 51% 55% 52% 50% 45% 45% 46% 47% 46% 
80 Security and investigation 0.6% 10.8% 59% 47% 37% 35% 38% 65% 65% 66% 66% 33% 34% 71% 68% 67% 68% 69% 75% 76% 76% 
15 Leather products 0.1% 10.9% 55% 43% 45% 47% 52% 54% 53% 54% 56% 58% 60% 62% 63% 62% 55% 55% 56% 57% 60% 
27 Electrical equipment 1.1% 11.9% 55% 48% 57% 56% 56% 64% 60% 67% 61% 52% 57% 56% 54% 52% 54% 54% 50% 48% 45% 
17 Paper products 0.8% 12.7% 51% 46% 47% 45% 47% 51% 50% 56% 57% 56% 54% 54% 53% 49% 52% 52% 50% 50% 51% 
28 Machinery and equipment 1.9% 14.6% 51% 44% 47% 47% 48% 52% 53% 52% 49% 48% 51% 52% 53% 52% 53% 52% 52% 52% 53% 
30 Other transport equipment 0.4% 15.0% 50% 56% 55% 40% 38% 40% 43% 43% 43% 57% 58% 58% 56% 56% 55% 53% 51% 51% 46% 
78 Employment activities 6.2% 21.2% 46% 24% 22% 37% 45% 46% 46% 45% 47% 46% 52% 52% 55% 53% 57% 53% 52% 50% 41% 
39 Remediation activities 0.0% 21.2% 45% 0% 0% 0% 0% 76% 74% 76% 71% 69% 65% 63% 55% 51% 50% 43% 38% 40% 40% 
61 Telecommunications 1.6% 22.8% 44% 77% 73% 69% 67% 70% 74% 78% 25% 25% 25% 30% 26% 28% 22% 24% 25% 24% 24% 
72 Scientific research and development 0.2% 23.0% 41% 52% 50% 27% 22% 37% 37% 51% 53% 34% 45% 46% 43% 34% 50% 41% 40% 41% 42% 
11 Beverages 0.5% 23.5% 41% 9% 9% 26% 26% 33% 34% 33% 38% 39% 38% 35% 65% 38% 65% 64% 63% 63% 62% 
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 1.6% 25.1% 41% 39% 42% 39% 40% 44% 47% 44% 45% 38% 37% 33% 41% 42% 43% 44% 40% 41% 39% 
22 Rubber and plastic products 1.3% 26.4% 40% 35% 41% 37% 42% 43% 43% 45% 41% 42% 43% 41% 39% 39% 38% 38% 36% 37% 36% 
70 Management consultancy 1.3% 27.7% 40% 45% 52% 48% 48% 56% 53% 53% 52% 41% 42% 36% 31% 30% 29% 27% 25% 24% 24% 
63 Information service 0.2% 27.9% 40% 15% 16% 19% 17% 23% 24% 34% 65% 54% 52% 51% 48% 49% 53% 52% 48% 47% 45% 
53 Postal and courier activities 2.1% 30.0% 39% 6% 8% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 92% 91% 92% 92% 93% 92% 92% 7% 7% 
94 Membership organizations 0.0% 30.1% 38% 0% 0% 0% 57% 58% 56% 55% 52% 44% 42% 41% 41% 41% 41% 42% 41% 42% 33% 
33 Repair and installation of machinery 0.5% 30.6% 34% 17% 9% 8% 28% 34% 35% 28% 29% 39% 44% 43% 47% 44% 30% 43% 44% 45% 41% 
64 Finance 1.2% 31.7% 33% 31% 28% 29% 29% 33% 31% 28% 30% 28% 29% 27% 36% 39% 37% 40% 38% 37% 38% 
55 Accommodation 0.9% 32.6% 31% 30% 28% 28% 29% 46% 44% 40% 37% 36% 33% 32% 31% 29% 25% 24% 23% 21% 19% 
58 Publishing activities 0.5% 33.1% 27% 26% 26% 23% 26% 34% 31% 31% 25% 32% 35% 34% 35% 36% 19% 20% 21% 20% 18% 
37 Sewerage 0.1% 33.2% 26% 36% 38% 42% 47% 65% 62% 58% 59% 54% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
8 Other mining 0.2% 33.4% 26% 21% 25% 25% 16% 31% 35% 31% 32% 35% 34% 33% 33% 19% 20% 20% 20% 15% 15% 
10 Food products 3.6% 36.9% 25% 23% 25% 24% 26% 30% 30% 30% 28% 27% 26% 24% 21% 23% 24% 25% 23% 21% 20% 
52 Warehousing and transportation 2.0% 38.9% 25% 9% 9% 16% 17% 23% 23% 32% 33% 32% 30% 30% 29% 28% 29% 28% 28% 25% 26% 
38 Waste collection 0.7% 39.6% 24% 14% 11% 13% 13% 25% 26% 28% 29% 25% 30% 31% 28% 31% 33% 26% 24% 24% 23% 
77 Rental and leasing 0.4% 40.0% 23% 13% 19% 23% 24% 26% 24% 25% 25% 25% 22% 22% 23% 22% 26% 24% 24% 25% 25% 
46 Wholesale trade (excl. motor vehicles) 9.6% 49.6% 23% 19% 20% 20% 21% 24% 24% 26% 24% 23% 24% 24% 23% 23% 24% 24% 24% 23% 23% 
79 Travel agency 0.3% 50.0% 23% 20% 21% 19% 20% 32% 29% 31% 21% 25% 25% 28% 27% 13% 21% 21% 21% 20% 20% 
95 Repair of computers and goods 0.2% 50.1% 22% 12% 20% 20% 25% 36% 40% 37% 34% 33% 18% 15% 16% 16% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
13 Textiles 1.5% 51.7% 21% 12% 12% 13% 17% 14% 16% 16% 24% 22% 22% 25% 24% 24% 26% 27% 28% 28% 30% 
66 Financial support 0.8% 52.5% 21% 12% 16% 14% 14% 24% 24% 25% 27% 24% 22% 22% 17% 16% 24% 24% 24% 24% 25% 
25 Fabricated metal products 3.0% 55.5% 21% 12% 12% 20% 19% 23% 23% 23% 25% 14% 21% 21% 20% 21% 24% 23% 23% 23% 21% 
47 Retail trade (excl. motor vehicles) 8.9% 64.3% 20% 5% 5% 8% 15% 21% 23% 26% 24% 22% 22% 21% 20% 27% 27% 25% 24% 24% 23% 
62 Computer programming and consultancy 1.8% 66.2% 17% 3% 6% 5% 11% 23% 26% 28% 24% 21% 22% 22% 21% 16% 17% 17% 16% 14% 14% 
92 Gambling 0.1% 66.2% 17% 0% 19% 16% 16% 17% 20% 19% 20% 18% 17% 20% 18% 17% 17% 19% 21% 16% 16% 
42 Civil engineering 1.4% 67.7% 16% 6% 7% 9% 12% 20% 22% 22% 21% 20% 20% 16% 17% 17% 17% 17% 18% 18% 17% 
50 Water transport 0.1% 67.8% 16% 14% 18% 24% 30% 36% 31% 33% 26% 24% 6% 6% 6% 5% 4% 4% 5% 4% 20% 
81 Buildings and landscape 2.4% 70.1% 16% 7% 4% 9% 9% 27% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 24% 18% 16% 15% 13% 10% 9% 8% 
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32 Other manufacturing 0.3% 70.5% 15% 9% 15% 15% 14% 16% 17% 15% 14% 14% 15% 14% 13% 15% 16% 15% 16% 15% 14% 
45 Wholesale and retail of motor vehicles 2.8% 73.3% 14% 13% 14% 14% 14% 15% 15% 17% 16% 16% 14% 13% 13% 13% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 
71 Architectural and engineering 1.3% 74.6% 13% 8% 10% 9% 8% 10% 11% 17% 18% 15% 15% 13% 11% 13% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13% 
60 Broadcasting 0.3% 74.8% 12% 28% 14% 14% 13% 14% 8% 8% 6% 6% 12% 13% 12% 12% 13% 13% 11% 11% 11% 
73 Advertising and market research 0.6% 75.4% 12% 13% 12% 10% 10% 14% 15% 13% 15% 14% 14% 12% 11% 11% 11% 10% 10% 11% 10% 
16 Wood products except furniture 0.6% 76.0% 11% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 18% 18% 14% 17% 17% 17% 18% 18% 19% 25% 
82 Office support 0.7% 76.8% 11% 9% 12% 15% 15% 14% 7% 17% 12% 10% 11% 9% 10% 11% 11% 11% 10% 10% 10% 
56 Food and beverage service 2.4% 79.1% 11% 5% 11% 10% 15% 13% 14% 16% 14% 12% 11% 10% 11% 11% 10% 10% 9% 9% 9% 
96 Personal services 0.7% 79.9% 10% 5% 5% 12% 11% 15% 14% 14% 12% 12% 11% 11% 10% 9% 10% 10% 10% 8% 8% 
14 Wearing apparel 0.4% 80.3% 10% 11% 11% 6% 7% 7% 9% 11% 10% 11% 11% 12% 13% 10% 10% 11% 11% 11% 10% 
2 Forestry 0.1% 80.4% 9% 8% 18% 18% 13% 15% 16% 15% 24% 15% 5% 6% 6% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
93 Sports 0.3% 80.7% 9% 4% 3% 8% 10% 12% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 10% 10% 9% 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 
18 Printing and reproduction 0.9% 81.7% 8% 4% 5% 7% 8% 8% 8% 10% 10% 10% 10% 9% 8% 7% 6% 7% 6% 6% 7% 
41 Construction of buildings 3.0% 84.7% 7% 2% 4% 5% 4% 11% 9% 9% 9% 8% 6% 5% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 10% 
59 Motion and television production 0.2% 84.9% 7% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 12% 7% 8% 2% 9% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 
1 Crop and animal 0.4% 85.2% 5% 6% 5% 12% 6% 8% 8% 7% 6% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 
43 Specialised construction 5.1% 90.4% 4% 3% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 4% 3% 1% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 4% 5% 4% 
31 Furniture 0.7% 91.1% 4% 1% 1% 1% 2% 7% 8% 7% 7% 6% 1% 1% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
49 Land transport 3.7% 94.8% 4% 2% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 4% 3% 4% 3% 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 
68 Real estate activities 0.7% 95.5% 3% 0% 4% 6% 2% 5% 5% 8% 4% 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 
90 Arts and entertainment 0.1% 95.6% 3% 0% 0% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
5 Mining of coal and lignite 0.1% 95.7% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 22% 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
74 Other scientific and technical services 0.3% 96.0% 3% 7% 6% 5% 4% 6% 6% 8% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 2% 2% 2% 
99 Extraterritorial organizations 0.0% 96.0% 2% 0% 0% 12% 9% 5% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
69 Legal and accounting 1.1% 97.1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
86 Health activities 0.9% 97.9% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
85 Education 0.1% 98.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
91 Library and musea 0.0% 98.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
65 Insurance 0.0% 98.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
36 Water collection 0.4% 98.5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
87 Residential care 0.9% 99.4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
88 Social work and assistance 0.3% 99.7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
84 Public administration 0.2% 100.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
9 Mining support service 0.0% 100.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 Fishing 0.0% 100.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
75 Veterinary 0.0% 100.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
97 Domestic personnel 0.0% 100.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
7 Mining of metal ores 0.0% 100.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Table 5: Share of employment (FTE) at firms with partial or whole foreign ownership (direct and indirect) per year and split over NACE 2-digit sector. “Average” gives the 
average share over the period 1997-2014. Sectors ranked from highest to lowest average share. The column “employment” marks the share and the cumulative share the 
sector represents in total employment over the period 1997-2014. All sectors ranked higher than Travel Agency (NACE 79) are categorized as high MNC presence (shaded 
in grey) and the other sectors as low MNC presence. Information on foreign ownership obtained from the NBB’s FDI survey.  
  
 
42 
NACE code NACE Description # employees Cumulative share NACE industry 
47 Retail trade (excl. motor vehicles) 24079 14% Services 
46 Wholesale trade (excl. motor vehicles) 21014 26% Services 
43 Specialised construction 16447 35% Construction 
56 Food and beverage service 9743 41% Services 
45 Wholesale and retail of motor vehicles 8214 46% Services 
99 Extraterritorial organizations 7380 50% Services 
41 Construction of buildings 7050 54% Construction 
49 Land transport 5784 57% Services 
69 Legal and accounting 5143 60% Services 
10 Food products 3753 63% Manufacturing 
25 Fabricated metal products 3591 65% Manufacturing 
71 Architectural and engineering 3346 66% Services 
90 Arts and entertainment 3162 68% Services 
96 Personal services 2739 70% Services 
1 Crop and animal 2688 71% Agriculture 
66 Financial support 2678 73% Services 
9 Mining support service 2623 74% Agriculture 
74 Other scientific and technical services 2570 76% Services 
73 Advertising and market research 2534 77% Services 
81 Buildings and landscape 2467 79% Services 
62 Computer programming and consultancy 2260 80% Services 
86 Health activities 2236 81% Services 
18 Printing and reproduction 1596 82% Manufacturing 
64 Finance 1560 83% Services 
52 Warehousing and transportation support services 1539 84% Services 
91 Library and musea 1402 85% Services 
82 Office support 1355 86% Services 
59 Motion and television production 1344 86% Services 
55 Accommodation 1250 87% Services 
77 Rental and leasing 1231 88% Services 
70 Management consultancy 1180 89% Services 
31 Furniture 1164 89% Manufacturing 
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 1152 90% Manufacturing 
68 Real estate activities 1119 91% Services 
16 Wood products except furniture 1012 91% Manufacturing 
28 Machinery and equipment 948 92% Manufacturing 
42 Civil engineering 947 92% Construction 
14 Wearing apparel 875 93% Manufacturing 
32 Other manufacturing 822 93% Manufacturing 
13 Textiles 816 94% Manufacturing 
93 Sports 800 94% Services 
5 Mining of coal and lignite 799 95% Agriculture 
27 Electrical equipment 759 95% Manufacturing 
79 Travel agency 755 95% Services 
2 Forestry 636 96% Agriculture 
29 Motor vehicles 632 96% Manufacturing 
22 Rubber and plastic products 584 97% Manufacturing 
33 Repair and installation of machinery 552 97% Manufacturing 
87 Residential care 531 97% Services 
58 Publishing activities 528 97% Services 
38 Waste collection 444 98% Utilities 
20 Chemicals and chemical products 410 98% Manufacturing 
30 Other transport equipment 383 98% Manufacturing 
26 Computer electronic and optical products 372 98% Manufacturing 
85 Education 358 99% Services 
8 Other mining 358 99% Agriculture 
95 Repair of computers and goods 325 99% Services 
24 Basic metals 303 99% Manufacturing 
17 Paper products 186 99% Manufacturing 
78 Employment activities 151 99% Services 
50 Water transport 141 99% Services 
15 Leather products 139 100% Manufacturing 
51 Air transport 105 100% Services 
53 Postal and courier activities 90 100% Services 
11 Beverages 89 100% Manufacturing 
75 Veterinary 68 100% Services 
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63 Information service 64 100% Services 
60 Broadcasting 62 100% Services 
94 Membership organizations 57 100% Services 
65 Insurance 46 100% Services 
3 Fishing 27 100% Agriculture 
35 Electricity Gas steam supply 22 100% Utilities 
21 Pharmaceutical products 21 100% Manufacturing 
61 Telecommunications 21 100% Services 
92 Gambling 17 100% Services 
72 Scientific research and development 17 100% Services 
12 Tobacco products 16 100% Manufacturing 
36 Water collection 14 100% Utilities 
84 Public administration 14 100% Services 
80 Security and investigation 12 100% Services 
7 Mining of metal ores 11 100% Agriculture 
19 Coke and refined petroleum products 8 100% Manufacturing 
37 Sewerage 6 100% Utilities 
97 Domestic personnel 5 100% Services 
88 Social work and assistance 4 100% Services 
39 Remediation activities 1 100% Utilities 
Table 6: Employment at start-up firms during 1986 – 1992 (# employees in year of start-up) split over 
NACE Rev.2 2-digit sectors and ranked based on employment (largest to smallest). “Cumulative share” 
refers to the cumulative share of start-up employment represented by the sector and its preceding sectors. 
Entry is corrected for spurious entrants. Most start-ups are wholesale and retail shops, construction 
tradesmen and restaurants and bars. 
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Appendix B: Alternative measures for business dynamism 
 
We conduct robustness analysis and calculate different measures of business dynamism. A first measure is the 
total job reallocation rate, i.e. the sum of job creation and destruction expressed as a percentage of overall 
employment. This can be seen as an indication of the level of job reallocation between firms. A second measure 
is the cross sectional standard deviation of the DHS growth rates as an indicator for the dispersion of the 
distribution. A third measure is the within-firm volatility of employment weighted growth rates within a 10 year 
horizon as developed in  Davis et al. (2007). 
We also include extra robustness checks on the calculation method of the growth rate differentials. We calculate 
the dispersion (90-10 differential) of the unweighted firm growth rate distribution and also study the dispersion 
(90-10 differential) of the turnover growth rate distribution. Finally we also investigate using the end of year 
number of employees post 1996 instead of the average number of FTE.   
Fig. 15 shows the first four measures. We clearly observe that also these too point to a clear decline of business 
dynamism over the past decades. The job reallocation rate (Fig. 15a) initially goes up and clearly comes down 
after the mid ‘90s. The standard deviation of the employment growth rate distribution (Fig. 15b) continuously 
declines for both the unweighted and the employment weighted distribution. The within-firm volatility shown in 
Fig. 15c remarkable declines as well.40 Finally, Fig. 15d gives the 90-10 differential for the unweighted distribution 
of firm growth rates for both all firms and continuing firms only. Here too we see a decline. 
Fig. 16 shows the evolution of business dynamism measured via turnover. It shows the 90-10 differential of both 
the turnover weighted and the unweighted distribution of turnover DHS growth rates. We calculate dynamism 
based on the nominal value of turnover and based on the real value of the turnover. To come to the real value of 
turnover, we deflate turnover with industry specific deflators from EUKLEMS. The deflator for gross value add 
is used. This deflator offers NACE Rev. 2 2-digit specific estimates41 that cover the full-length of the studied 
period (1985-2014). Firms categorized as “small firms” can report turnover on a voluntary basis, all other firms 
are required to report turnover. As show in Appendix A, in 1985 approx. 54,000 out of 91,000 firms reported 
turnover, in 2014 57,000 out of 407,000 firms reported turnover. In 1985 firms reporting turnover represented 
                                                          
40 The within-firm volatility for the balanced panel of firms that are continuously active in the studied period is not shown, 
but declines as well. This measure is filtered of all entry and exit activity. 
41 Smaller NACE Rev. 2 2 digit industries are grouped together by EUKLEMS. EUKLEMS reclassifies older versions of industry 
classifications to NACE Rev. 2. 
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1.35M employees and firms not reporting turnover represented 150,000 employees. In 2014 firms reporting 
turnover represented 1.51M FTEs vs. 675,000 FTEs for firms not reporting turnover. The steep growth in the 
number of firms and overall employment growth in the period 1985-2014 is predominantly driven by small firms 
that do not report turnover. Furthermore, the manufacturing sector, with on average larger firms, is overrepresented 
in the subsample of firm reporting turnover. Turnover dynamism can therefore not be regarded as a complete 
proxy for overall business dynamism. 42  Nevertheless, all measures for turnover dynamism also indicate a 
dynamism decline that sets in around 2nd half of the 1990s and early 2000s . This is a strong robustness check on 
the fact that there is also a clear decline in dynamism for larger and (since size is correlated with age) more 
established firms. 
Fig. 17 finally shows the evolution of dynamism (90-10 differential) for 2 alternative calculation methods for 
employment. Throughout the paper employment post 1996 is calculated based on the average number of FTEs 
whereas pre-1996 the average number of employees (headcount) is used. FTE is a better measure than headcount 
when part-time work is rising. As explained in the paragraph on entry and exit, post 1996, a self-employed business 
owner active in the business is not reported anymore in a firm’s employment statistics. This leads to a drop of 0.4 
employees at start-up firms leading us to believe that on average an active self-employed business owner counted 
as 0.4 employees. Fig. 17a uses average employment, not corrected for the self-employed and Fig. 17b corrects 
for the self-employed by adding 0.4 employees to each firm. We see a decline in dynamism that sets in around 
2000. 
 
  
                                                          
42 We also work based on unconsolidated accounts that reports turnover that includes intercompany turnover. This 
potentially leads to double counting of the same final turnover. 
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a Job reallocation rate b Employment growth standard deviation 
  
c Within-firm volatility d 90-10 differential (unweighted distribution) 
  
Fig. 15 The evolution of different measures for business dynamism. We see a decline for all of them. 
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a Nominal turnover, weighted b Nominal turnover, unweighted 
  
c Real turnover, weighted d Real turnover, unweighted 
  
Fig. 16 90-10 differentials for both the turnover weighted (a and c) and unweighted distribution (b and d) of DHS turnover 
growth rates. Both nominal (a and b) and real values (c and d) for turnover are used. Real values are obtained by using the 
NACE 2-digit specific deflators for gross value add from EUKLEMS. All four measures show a decline in business 
dynamism that starts late ’90s or early 2000 depending on the measure. 
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a Not corrected with 0.4 employees B Corrected with 0.4 employees 
  
Fig. 17 90-10 differentials for weighted employment growth rates distribution. The end of year number of employees is 
used to calculate employment post 1996. Figure b corrects for the fact the self-employed business owner is not counted as 
an employee post 1996 by adding 0.4 employees to each firm. We see a dynamism trend change around the year 2000. 
  
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
All firms All firms (3y MA) All firms (HP)
Cont. Cont. (3y MA) Cont. (HP)
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
All firms All firms (3y MA) All firms (HP)
Cont. Cont. (3y MA) Cont. (HP)
 
49 
Appendix C The Role of Compositional Shifts  
 
In this section we quantify the contribution of compositional shifts to the change in business dynamism. Bijnens 
& Konings (2017) described the significant shift in the structure of the Belgian firm landscape throughout the 
previous decades: jobs flow from the manufacturing to the services industry, from smaller to larger and from 
younger to older firms. It could well be that the change in overall dynamism is not driven by an intrinsic change 
in dynamism of a certain type of firms, but driven by the fact that jobs are shifted towards less dynamics parts of 
the economy without these parts becoming less dynamic per se. 
Reallocation rate in the services industry is significantly higher than the one for the manufacturing industry. A 
shift of jobs to the more dynamic services industry would hence increase the overall dynamism of the economy. 
This shift works in the opposite direction compared to the overall decline in dynamism. Younger firms experience 
reallocation rates that lie substantially above the rate of older firms. As discussed in the main body of this paper, 
firm age is also linked with firm size. Overall a shift of jobs away from smaller, younger firms towards bigger and 
older firms will have a negative impact on dynamism. The questions remains, however, how big this impact is. 
We conduct a simple shift share decomposition analysis. We allocate all firms to different cells defined by 88 
NACE 2-digit industries, 8 firm age groups (0y to 5y, 6y-10y, and 10+y) and 8 firm size groups based on number 
of employees (1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999 and 1000+). We focus on the change in job 
flows, more specifically the overall change and the within cell component of the decomposition. The within cell 
component yields the change in the overall flow rate if every cell would have kept the same level of employment. 
The difference between these 2 indicate to what extend compositional changes drive the overall change as opposed 
to the within cell changes. We do this for the change in job reallocation, creation and destruction rates between 
the extreme values before the technology crisis of 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008. We use a 3 year moving 
average to minimize the impact of short term variations. 
The 90-10 differential is also decomposed. It is, however, not possible to have an exact decomposition of a non-
parametrical measure. We follow a simplified approach similar to the shift cell decomposition and calculate the 
dispersion of each cell in both time periods and take the employment weighted average over the cells. We also 
calculate the cell value for the second time period and weight these based on the employment shares of the first 
period and calculate the within cell change. The remainder yields the impact of the compositional change.  
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 Job Reallocation Job Creation Job Destruction 90-10 differential 
Overall  Δ 1998-2007 -2.66 pp -1.25 pp -1.14 pp -0.074 
Impact of changing composition of businesses: 
Only Sector 0.48 pp -18% 0.69 pp -56% -0.21 pp 15%  17%* 
Only Age -0.52 pp 19% -0.41 pp 33% -0.10 pp 7%  30%* 
Only Size 0.23 pp -9% 0.07 pp -6% 0.16 pp -11%  -4%* 
Sector, Age & Size 
Combined 
0.05 pp -2% 0.11 pp -9% -0.06 pp 4%   
 
Table 2: Role of Compositional Shifts on Change in Job Reallocation, Creation & Destruction Rate 
Note: Δ1998-2007 represents the change in percentage points of the 3y moving average of the studied flow between 1998 and 2007. The impact of the changing composition 
is calculated as the difference between de actual change of the flow rate and the within cell component of this change. The cells are defined based on sector, age and size 
individually and sector, age and size combined. *The decomposition for the 90-10 differential is an approximation. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the result. We see that the job reallocation rate dropped with 2.66 percentage points between 
its peak in 1998 and the bottom in 2007. The impact of the shift between sectors (i.e. mainly the shift from 
manufacturing to services industries) is 0.48 percentage points positive. This means that the drop in reallocation 
rate would have actually been 18% higher if jobs weren’t shifted between sectors. For the job destruction rate and 
the 90-10 differential, shifts between sectors actually strengthens the decrease of the dynamism measure. Shifts 
between firm sizes have a positive, though smaller impact on the flow rates. Firm age is an important factor and 
actually the only factor that has a consistent negative impact on the studied flow rates. 19% of the drop in job 
reallocation, 30% of the drop of the 90-10 differential and even 33% of the drop in job creation rate can be 
attributed to a shift of jobs towards older, less dynamic firms. This is consistent with the findings in the main body 
of this paper, that the loss in business dynamism in linked with the decreased activity of younger firms. 
For the job reallocation rate, the structural shifts in the economy actually work in opposite directions. Whilst shifts 
between sectors and firms sizes lower the drop in reallocation rate, shifts between firms with different ages increase 
the drop in reallocation rate. This leads to the fact that the combined effects cancel out and actually are very 
modest. Only a small part of the job reallocation rate can be attributed to the changing composition of the Belgian 
firm landscape. For the 90-10 differential the impact is higher as both sector and age changes strengthen the 
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decrease. Nevertheless, we can in any case conclude changing firm composition only partially explains the drop 
in dynamism and a significant part of the decrease remains unexplained.  
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